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Introduction
Housing has a genuine set of characteristics that make of it one of the most complex good
to analyze. This complexity imposes several constraints on the modeling choices. First,
its duality (serving both the purposes of consumption and investment) combined with
its durability implies the existence of different tenures. The segmentation between agents
who are willing to consume or/and to invest into housing raises the issue of tenure
choice. Moreover, the cost of housing implies to consider the access to credit market
for the needy ones. Finally, the strong heterogeneity of housing allows for another
segmentation based on the individual income and the position in the life-cycle. As a
consequence, any model designed to study housing should incorporate heterogeneous
agents making life-cycle decisions, and therefore be dynamic.
The housing market cannot be considered as a frictionless market. It is on the
contrary subject to several types of frictions. First, an informational asymmetry, related
to the unobservability of some housing or buyer attributes, exists. Second, finding a
house requires a search effort and therefore generates a cost. After having found a house,
the individual has to bear the adjustment cost of possessing two houses at the same time
in order to move her belongings. Third, there is a moving cost associated to the mobility.
Finally, there are large amounts of transaction fees when buying or selling a dwelling.
All these frictions act as incentives to reduce the number of transitions in the housing
market. The main modelling implication of these frictions is to agents to look-forward
when taking decisions.
Finally, a house is spatially fixed. Each house belongs to a neighborhood and to
a local labor market. The location of a house is a fundamental determinant of its
price. Several mechanisms explain this reality. In the literature, various items have been
mentioned such as the accessibility to job-centers, and neighborhood amenities (presence
of schools, stores, connection to public transportation). Other types of neighborhood
characteristics (green areas, characteristics of the neighbors) have an important impact
on prices. The major consequence of this pricing scheme is its potential segregation
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implication. Therefore, how agents value each of the neighborhood amenities is of
primary interest in order to understand the mechanism of segregation.
What remains unclear is the precise role of the labor market in residential segregation.
The sense of causality between segregation and bad local labor market outcomes is not
clear. A convincing mechanism is the one of spatial mismatch, which is related to the
disconnection between job centers and the location of some individuals. In the literature,
several inputs have been used to produce spatial mismatch (difference in firm’s entry
cost between locations, individual search effort, relocation costs). And yet, depending
on the mechanism at play, the cure in terms of policy may be completely different. All
these mechanisms require to build models in order to be able to disentangle among
several potential explanations.
To summarize, in order to take into account the complexity of the housing market, we
need to build models where forward-looking agents choose their locations and housing
attributes. I will refer to this class of model as structural to emphasize the fact that
the individual behavior is derived from the outcome of a model. Once controlled for
the neighborhood unobserved characteristics, the role of the labor market in spatial
inequalities can be analyzed. One shall try to take into estimation the former models
using survey data.
From these observations, it is clear that the housing market is at the heart of several
inequality mechanisms, and especially the ones within and between cities.
In this thesis, I develop structural models to investigate three topics related to
the spatial dimension of housing and the related inequalities. In the first essay, we
propose a new methodology to estimate individual valuation of housing features. In
the second, I study how a policy, namely the French Enterprise Zones, has been able
to affect individual job market prospects in the presence of search and spatial frictions.
Finally, in the third essay, I develop a general equilibrium model that includes the
housing characteristics described before and studies the implication in terms of long-run
inequalities.
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These models are similar in the way to think of individual choices as the solution
to an optimization problem. However, they differ substantially in the used modeling
strategy. The first essay is a partial equilibrium model of the housing market where
our primary focus is on individual choices. The transitions in the labor market are
not considered. In the second, I develop a general equilibrium model of the labor
market. The individual choices in the housing market are considered, but are not
derived from a formal model. In the third, I consider a general equilibrium model of all
labor, housing and education markets where agents are heterogeneous with regard to
several dimensions. There is no construction sector, the dynamics of prices are instead
based on individual forward-looking expectations of price sequences.
When taking these models into estimation, I face several challenges. The first is
related to the quality and exhaustivity of the data. Indeed, the spatial dimension is
crucial in my analysis. Moreover, I am interested in several variables describing the
events over the life-cycle. Since the available data are topic-specific (housing, labor,
wealth), all the necessary variables are not available in a single dataset. As a consequence,
the working samples are composed of several datasets with the inherent inconsistencies.
Finally, the lack of a dataset that records individual mobility in the housing market
over time has been a great source of frustration. Thus, the essays consider innovative
methods to handle individual mobility, either by using modelling tricks that avoid the
need to know the next location or using moments over a long period to fit individual
mobility patterns.
Second, another important issue is related to the computation time. In the models
considered, rational agents make inter-temporal choices solving a recursive problem
over a long period of time. This is highly demanding in terms of computing time.
In the first essay, we use the classical maximum likelihood estimation techniques. In
the second, I develop a multi-stage estimation algorithm that combines a hierarchical
Bayesian method with moment matching and a generalized additive model for policy
simulation purpose. The final essay is not estimated, but the resolution of the model,
especially the recovering of the prices, is fastened using a cluster.
3
I can now turn to a more detailed description of the essays.
In the first essay, we propose a new method for identifying individual willingness
to pay for the characteristics of a housing unit, including the neighborhood attributes
in a hedonic framework. Since the seminal work of Rosen (1974), economists have
been interested in the estimation of the willingness to pay for housing characteristics.
The existence of unobserved housing characteristics that may be correlated with the
observed ones makes the identification issue complicated. In a subsequent work, Brown
and Rosen (1982), and later Epple (1987); Bartik (1987b) argue that identification can be
achieved using multimarket data, linearized first order conditions, and an additional
instrument for handling the simultaneity of the market equilibrium.
During the nineties, two advances in the literature generated a new perspective on
the latter identification problem. First, the work of Manski (1993) raises the issue of
how to measure the willingness to pay for neighborhood attributes when individuals
sort in space according to both observed and unobserved characteristics. Second, the
outstanding analysis of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) introduces an original way of
handling unobserved characteristics in a market with differentiated and durable goods
like housing.
Later, in an innovative paper, Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004) shed a new
light to the types of identifying assumptions that are necessary to learn about the param-
eters that characterize supply and demand in hedonic models. The results demonstrate
that identification can be achieved in the same framework as Rosen. In order to achieve
that, several assumptions are needed. First, all characteristics should be observed. Sec-
ond, a nonlinear relation between prices and observed characteristics is needed. Finally,
one needs additivity and separability in the utility function. In a companion paper,
Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2009) relax both additivity and separability. In that
case, identification is possible only with multimarket data. The main insight from the
framework of these two papers is that in equilibrium, there is a nonlinear relationship
between the optimal demand for observed housing characteristics, the prices and the
individual observed characteristics. Indeed, in this economic structure, the individual
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observed characteristics act as an exogenous shift in the marginal price schedule. In real
data, such a feature is rare.
A different strand of the literature implements BLP style model into housing demand
and location choice. Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) use such a strategy, exploiting
the geographical boundaries for handling the endogeneity of school choice, and the
endogeneity of price is dealt with using prices in different markets. However, this
estimation is subject to the incidental parameter problem since a housing specific effect
is estimated for each housing unit.
In the first essay of this thesis, we develop an estimation method that helps to
overcome the limits mentioned above. Namely, we estimate a dynamic hedonic housing
model with unobserved heterogeneity. In contrast to the former literature, we build a
dynamic model of mobility decision along with a hedonic model of housing valuation.
Our approach follows Melnichov (2000) and separates the individual’s choice problem
into an optimal stopping problem in the decision to stay or to move and a hedonic model
of housing choice and valuation. First, the conditional choice probability of whether to
stay or move along with the length of stay identifies the preference parameters. Second,
the rent regulation creates an effective independency between market conditions and the
level of rent. We carried the estimation using the 2002 and 2006 French housing surveys.
The estimation results demonstrate that the observed and unobserved housing
characteristics are negatively correlated. Failure to take into account the endogeneity
bias could underestimate the true value of the observed characteristics of housing.
After highlighting the importance of segregation, in the second essay, I propose a
model to evaluate a policy aimed at decreasing the heterogeneity between locations in
the labor market outcomes. Starting in 1996, the French government implemented an
Enterprise Zones Policy in order to circumvent the potential spatial mismatch problem
affecting the neighborhoods located in the inner cities. In practice, the policy offer tax
cuts to firms located in Enterprise Zones. There is a large controversy in the literature
on the effectiveness of these kinds of policy. The survey by Papke (1993) reports a
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positive effect on the firm creation, while there is no consensus as to the impact on
unemployment.
I depart from the preceding literature by starting with the premises that the labor
market is characterized by considerable frictions, and the housing market is subject to
considerable amount of relocations. As a consequence, the standard treatment effect
may not be suited for the evaluation of these kinds of policies.
I develop and estimate a dynamic general equilibrium model of individual choices
in the labor market along with a location choice model of individuals and firms. I
investigate to which extent the French Enterprise Zones (FEZ henceforth) policy has
changed individual prospects in the labor market.
I bring together the literature on estimable equilibrium search models (Bontemps,
Robin, and van den Berg, 1998; Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002), and the urban equilib-
rium model of matching (Coulson, Laing, and Wang, 2001; Smith and Zenou, 2003).
The evaluation is based on a comparison between my estimates of the labor market
primitives after the policy implementation to a prediction of their value before the policy
introduction.
In the model I developed, each urban area is considered as a local labor market that
consists of a central location and a deprived inner suburb. I allow individuals and firms
to choose their location as a response to the policy. Also, individuals can commute
between both locations at no null cost. The main consequence of the policy for firms is to
change the rate of corporate, payroll and business taxes. I model the firm location choice
as the outcome of a dynamic discrete choice model where the constraints imposed by
the policy are endogenized. I introduce several channels under which a segmentation in
a local labor market is possible. First, I assume that there are agglomeration externalities
on the firm side, that result in a difference between the total number and the mean
productivity of firms across locations. In conjunction, I posit that there are informational
and search frictions resulting in a lower job arrival rate when the firm and individual
locations differ. The specific matching function between firms and individuals takes into
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account both the tensions in the market and the physical distance between the residential
and job locations.
The results show that the governmental diagnostic was right, while the effectiveness
of the cure is questioned. That is, the estimates show a large discrepancy between the
areas subjected to the policy and the rest of the urban space. In the evaluation part, I
show that the increase in the number of firms has very little effect on unemployment.
According to the model, the number of firms in the ZFUs should be multiplied by at least
20 before expecting any decisive effect. Moreover, the model highlights the importance
of the physical distance between individuals and jobs. Given the challenges ahead of
the French Enterprise Zones, a change in policy should be considered.
In the final essay, I investigate the consequence of spatial inequalities on the level of
long-run inequalities. There is a large number of mechanisms underlying the formation
of inequalities. I focus here on the spatial ones when interactions at a small geographical
level generate differences in education and labor markets outcomes. The role of social
interactions in generating inequalities is largely admitted, while most of the time ignored
when modeling individual behavior. A notable exception is provided by Benabou (1993,
1996) who showed how powerful this tool is in generating an equilibrium distribution
of income in space while highlighting interdependencies and complementaries between
housing, labor and education markets.
The interactions between housing, labor and education play a central role in these
inequalities. Empirical work has investigated the extent to which differentials in housing
prices across jurisdictions reflect differentials of school quality, see e.g. (Bayer, Ferreira,
and McMillan, 2007) and (Black, 1999). Even though there is no agreement on the
magnitude of the willingness-to-pay for each neighborhood feature, everyone recognizes
the characteristics of a neighborhood as major determinants of housing prices. Therefore,
the interaction between the neighborhood features and prices plays an important role in
inequalities between locations, that is, the distribution of wealth over locations.
In this essay, I develop an overlapping generation model to study the effects of
social interactions on the dynamics of inequalities across individuals, locations and
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generations. I include in the standard life-cycle model heterogeneous agents, a realistic
housing market, aggregate uncertainty and a bequest motive. Moreover, the locations
are heterogenous with regard to their level of social capital, that influences household
labor productivity and the level of human capital of the next generation.
At the household decision level, the key mechanism underlying my model is the
trade-off between the level of social capital and housing prices. Some households may
be finance constrained due to the cost of a housing unit. The fixity of supply in each
neighborhood combined with the borrowing constraints prevent some households from
living in their preferred area, which leads to segregation.
Moreover, the discrepancy in school quality between locations leads to differences in
the next generation level of human capital. Therefore, the effects of borrowing constraints
are strengthened by their implications for parents but also for children.
My results show that the model performs well in explaining homeownership, unem-
ployment and price dispersion. They also show that the current homeownership rate
is higher than its equilibrium level, and the equilibrium prices will be more dispersed
with a clear segmentation between low-price locations and high-price neighborhoods. A
decomposition of the lifetime inequality shows that the initial endowment in inheritance
explains more than 60% of long term inequalities, while the spatial inequalities account
for approximately 25% of the overall inequalities. I carry several experiments using the
model. One of the most interesting results is related to the model with no borrowing
constraint. That is, the main consequence of relaxing borrowing constraints is to increase
the level of prices. This outcome may be the explanation of the rise in housing prices
observed in the majority of the developed countries before the 2008 crisis. Among all
the policies considered, a mix of bequest taxation and social mixity would provide an
efficient control for the spatial and generational inequalities.
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Essay 1
Estimation of Dynamic Hedonic
Housing Models with Unobserved
Heterogeneity
Introduction
In this essay, we are interested in the hedonic identification of individual willingness
to pay for housing observed and unobserved characteristics which is central to the
understanding of the mechanism of segregation. We propose a new methodology to
estimate a housing demand model with unobserved housing characteristics, which
also includes unobserved neighborhood attributes. Most of the literature on location
choice, such as Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) or Bajari and Kahn (2005), analyzes
individuals who choose in which house among all housing units to live or, in a more
simplified setting, choice probability of each housing unit is a function of unobserved
housing characteristics of all available housing units. Even in the simpler setup of
neighborhood choice, the choice probability is a function of unobserved neighborhood
characteristics in all neighborhoods plus other structural parameters. Estimation of these
models is extremely complex due to the large number of choices, since the number of
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housing units or, even in a simplified model, the number of neighborhoods is usually
large, thus causing finite sample difficulties. Often, strong assumptions on the error
term of the utility function need to be imposed.
To overcome this, we follow Bayer et al. (2009) and estimate a dynamic model
of housing demand. Their framework, inspired by Carranza (2006), separates the
individual’s problem into two distinct choices: an optimal stopping problem in the
decision to stay or move; and conditional on this decision, a static discrete choice over
where to move, which follows the static location choice model of Bayer, Ferreira, and
McMillan (2007). In contrast to Bayer et al. (2009) and other literature, we use the
following two features of the data as the main sources of identification. First, we use the
conditional choice probability of whether to stay or move as well as the housing tenure
information. Since the mobility decision depends only the housing characteristics of
the current housing unit, the estimation problem becomes much simpler. It consists in
recovering for each housing unit one housing specific characteristic parameter based
on one conditional choice probability of moving out. The dynamic choice problem of
staying or moving out does not increase its complexity with the number of housing
units or neighborhoods at all. This greatly helps identification and estimation. This
is in contrast to the conventional location model where choices are over all housing
units. There, choice probability of each house is a function of unobserved housing
characteristics of all housing units.
Second, we use both the observed housing characteristics and the housing location
information. That is, we combine the static hedonic literature and the dynamic mobility
choice literature. The conventional static hedonic approach by Rosen (1974), Epple
(1987), Bartik (1987b) and others, only uses data on the choice of observed housing char-
acteristics, and thus have difficulties in dealing with unobserved housing characteristics.
They have to assume that unobserved housing characteristics are independent of the
observed ones. By using both the tenure and mobility choice data and the housing
characteristics data, we can allow for correlation between observed and unobserved
housing characteristics. We also recover flexibly specified hedonic per period utility
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function and the individual specific utility shocks as well, when assuming the con-
ventional separability between housing and individual characteristics Otherwise, the
literature requires multimarket data and the assumption that the distributions of ob-
served individual and housing characteristics vary across market while the distribution
of unobserved characteristics do not. In our analysis, as we account for the correlation
between observed and unobserved housing characteristics, we only need data on one
housing market.
The two separate features of the data source are complementary in identifying the
model. Mobility and tenure information helps to identify hedonic utility function of
housing units because individuals whose deterministic utility of housing consumption is
high, stay at the housing unit longer. If we had just used the discrete mobility data, then
we would have only been able to identify the finite mixture distribution or parametrized
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity of each housing unit. By using additionally
housing characteristics data, which comes from the continuous choice of individuals,
we are able to recover the unobserved characteristics of each housing unit, and the
individual taste shocks as well.
We use data on rental apartments from the French Housing Survey. We exploit the
strong rent control regulation in France, which makes the rent effectively invariant to
changes in local economic conditions. Therefore, we do not need to worry about the
endogeneity of rent in the mobility decision due to the housing specific unobserved
heterogeneity. Therefore, we avoid the need for an instrument for price of a housing
consumption, which has always been a difficult issue in the housing literature.
1.1 Housing demand models with unobserved heterogeneity
1.1.1 The Literature of Hedonic Model of Housing
We briefly review the literature on housing demand using the hedonic framework.
The analysis of hedonic models was pioneered by Rosen (1974). In this paper, Rosen
suggests a two-step estimation to recover preferences parameters. In the first step, the
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marginal price function is recovered from the regression of price on attributes. Then,
the first-order-conditions (FOC) are used to estimate the utility function. However, as
noted by Brown and Rosen (1982), the second stage suffers from a simultaneity issue.
Hence, Brown and Rosen (1982) argue that using a linear approximation of the first
order conditions, relying on multi-markets data. In order to achieve identification with
multi-market data, it is necessary to assume that the preferences parameters are common
across markets while individual heterogeneity varies across markets. Subsequently,
Epple (1987) and Bartik (1987b) argue that the model is still not identified because
unobserved tastes affect both the quantity of an amenity consumed by an individual
and its price. Hence, they suggest to use instrumental variables.
The current literature departs from the preceding one in two directions: by using
nonparametric methods instead of a linear approximation of the FOC (Ekeland, Heck-
man, and Nesheim, 2004; Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim, 2009), and by allowing for
unobserved heterogeneity (Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan, 2007).
Let’s introduce some notation based on Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004)’s
model to make clear the identification issues. The individual’s utility function of a house
with observed characteristics z and utility shock ǫ is
U(z, x, c, ǫ)
where x is the vector of individual observed characteristics and c is the non-housing
consumption. An individual maximizes her utility subject to the following budget
constraint:
c+ P(z) ≤ y
where the price of non-housing consumption c is normalized to one. Then, the first
order condition that allows to recover housing demand is
Pz(z) = h(x, z, ǫ) ≡ Uz(z, x, y− P(z), ǫ)
Uc(z, x, y− P(z), ǫ)
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Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004) show that hedonic models with an addi-
tively separable utility function are nonparametrically identified with single market
data and present two methods for recovering the structural functions in such models.
Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2009) relax the additivity assumptions, and show
that only multimarket data identifies all parameters of the model. As stated before,
the underlying assumption for the identification based on multimarket data is that the
observed individual or housing characteristics need to be differently distributed across
markets but the unobserved individual or housing characteristics need to remain the
same. Moreover, another implicit assumption in the models of Ekeland, Heckman, and
Nesheim (2004) and Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2009) is that all housing charac-
teristics z are observable. In this setup, it is important to note that ǫ cannot be interpreted
as the unobserved housing characteristic since it is not included in the price function. If
the individual knew that the price of unobserved characteristics was zero, she would
consume it at the bliss point and thus the distribution of ǫ would be degenerate If we
include ǫ in the price equation, then the price equation becomes
P(z, ǫ) = δzz+ δǫǫ
This is the price equation analyzed in Epple (1987). Applications of this model
include Bajari and Kahn (2005), who use nonparametric methods to estimate the coef-
ficients δz and interpret the residuals as the unobserved housing characteristics. Once
unobserved characteristics are known, then one could just proceed to estimate the pa-
rameters in the standard way discussed above. However, to consistently estimate the
coefficients of the price equation requires dealing with the correlation of z and ǫ this is
way Epple (1987), Bajari and Kahn (2005) assume that they are not correlated with each
other.
The major difficulty is to allow for correlation between z and ǫ. This requires an
instrument, that is, a variable correlated with the observed housing characteristics z but
uncorrelated with the unobserved housing characteristics ǫ.
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Another strand of the literature, pioneered by Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007),
tries to estimate the unobserved housing characteristics directly from the housing choice
of the individuals. Denote the observable housing characteristics of a housing unit j to
be zj and the unobservable characteristics to be ηj. Since ηj are not observable, Bayer,
Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) follow the convention of the discrete choice literature and
specify the housing specific unobserved heterogeneity ηj.
Then, the optimal housing choice of an individual i can be expressed as follows:
k = argmax
j
{U(zj, xi, yi − P(zj, ηj,wj), ηj, ǫij)}
where ǫij is the individual i specific utility shock for housing unit j, which is assumed
to be i.i.d. extreme value distributed. Now, the price is a function of both the observed
characteristics s zj and unobserved characteristics ηj and a price shock wj. Furthermore,
they assume that
U(zj, xi, pj, ηj) = V(zj, xi, pj) + ηj + ǫij
where pj = P(zj, ηj,wj). Then, household i’s choice probability of a housing unit k
equals
p(i, k) =
exp[V(zk, xi, pk, ηk)]
∑l exp[V(zl , xi, pl , ηl)]
The maximum likelihood estimation is then based on the above household choice
probability over all the housing units in the data. The estimation follows Berry, Levin-
sohn, and Pakes (1995), and the derivation of the housing unobservable is feasible thanks
to the contraction mapping of Berry (1994). Notice that the number of housing specific
heterogeneity terms ηj equals the total sample size of housing units, which makes the
estimation exercise subject to the finite sample problem. 1
1 Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2004), after implementing the above estimation algorithm, hint that
a potential approach that is not subject to the finite sample bias would be to assume that ηj follows a
distribution that is nonparametrically estimated, for instance finite mixture. This would certainly avoid the
finite sample problem mentioned above, but would also create an additional issue that V(zj, xi, pj) + ηj
can no longer be obtained à la BLP style in the first stage using the contraction mapping, which may add
complexity in the estimation.
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In a more simpler setting, one could modify the specification of the housing specific
unobserved heterogeneity as follows.
ηj = ξn
where ξn is the neighborhood specific unobserved heterogeneity. Even then, the
estimation problem could be subject to the finite sample problem if the number of obser-
vations per neighborhood is small, which is typical in a disaggregated neighborhood
level data. Furthermore, it is known that the logit choice framework imposes strong
functional form (I.I.A.) on the utility function, which may distort the welfare calculation
(see Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) for more details.).
Another issue in the estimation of the above location model is the endogeneity of the
housing characteristics zk, i.e. their potential correlation with the neighborhood specific
unobserved heterogeneity. A proposed solution for the location-related characteristics is
to rely on quasi-random variation like geographical boundaries (Bayer, Ferreira, and
McMillan, 2007; Black, 1999). However, it is in general difficult to find an appropriate
instrument for all other housing characteristics, such as number of rooms, since one has
to find an instrument that is correlated with the observed characteristics but uncorrelated
with the unobserved characteristics2.
The literature that is the closest to our paper is Bishop (2010). This approach is based
on the sorting model of Epple and Sieg (1999) which predicts the positive correlation
between household’s neighborhood quality and average permanent income of house-
hold’s residence. The issue there is that the permanent income is not observed, and
additional instruments are required since Epple and Sieg (1999) predict a negative within
neighborhood correlation between observed and unobserved local income. Bishop (2010)
estimates a dynamic model of location choice with moving cost. The estimation proceeds
in two steps. In the first, a dynamic model of migration is estimated and a location
2For example, Bayer, Ferreira, andMcMillan (2007) uses prices of far away neighborhoods as instruments,
where the implicit assumption is that the unobserved characteristics of the far away neighborhoods are not
correlated.
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fixed effect is recovered. In the second, the location fixed effect is decomposed between
observed and unobserved determinants using the same argument as Bartik (1987a).
Nonetheless, in presence of individual sorting, the second step may still suffer from an
endogeneity bias.
1.1.2 The Dynamic Model
Instead of identifying the structural parameters solely from the residential choice of the
individuals, we additionally use the dynamic mobility choice, i.e. whether to stay in the
same residential unit or move. Let τ be the length of stay in the neighborhood, and Zi
and wi be the vector of the observed and unobserved characteristics of a housing unit i.
We assume that the relative rent of apartment i depends on the length of stay τ, housing
observed attributes and an unobserved component wi :
r(τ,Zi,wi)
In our framework, we consider the relative rent as an intuitive way to introduce the
individual choice problem. That is, the rent considered here summarizes the fact that,
when an individual stays longer, his rent relative to the cost of other housing units with
lower length of stay decreases.
Furthermore, we assume that the relative rent of a housing unit is determined as
follows
r(τ,Zi,wi) = r0(Zi,wi)g(τ)
where r0 is the rent at initial period, and g(τ) represents the over time change in
relative rent, which is entirely determined by the regulated uniform growth rate of rent,
where t0 is the initial period. We let the period zero rent equation to be linearly separable
between observed and unobserved heterogeneity, i.e.
r0(Z,w) = h(Z) + v(w)
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Where h(Z) is a function of observed attributes, and v(w) is the unobserved part of the
rent equation. Then, the individual in each period makes the choice between staying
and moving out of the house. Let the per period utility of staying in a house be specified
as.
γ1ri(τ) +
1
2
γ2ri(τ)
2 + µiτ + ǫ0τi
where the first two terms represent the negative utility from paying the rent ri, and
the fourth term represents the per period utility shock. The third term is a function of
observable and unobservable characteristics:
µiτ = [b(Zi,Xi,τ, uZ,i) + u(wi)]c(Xi,τ)ui
where c() is a function of individual observed characteristics Xi,τ, b() is the utility
component for observed attributes, which is a function of housing observed character-
istics Zi and individual observed characteristics Xi,τ. uZ,i and u(wi) are utility shocks
that captures the fact that the effects of the observed Z, and unobserved wi differ per
individuals. ui is the shock for the marginal utility of housing characteristics.
As we discussed before, we do not observe each component of the vector wi. Given
parameters of the rent equation h(), we can only recover v(wi), thus approximate the
utility component of unobservable characteristics as follows.
u(wi) ≈ uv,iv(wi)
That is, the utility components of the renting and the preference function are assumed
to be proportional. Thus, we estimate v(wi) the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on the
price, and the proportionality parameter uv,i between u(wi) and v(wi). As a consequence,
we can drop the term wi without loss of generality. This setup is similar to the one where
the utility function is linearly separable in other goods x = y − ri and a function of
housing characteristics Z.
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We denote the tenure invariant component of the rent as ri(0). Since the rent of
all subsequent periods is a deterministic function of the initial rent, all the subsequent
mobility choices are a function of ri(0). The choice specific value of staying is
V0(ri(0),Xiτ, τ, µi, ǫ0τi) = γ1r(τ,Zi, vi)+
1
2
γ2r(τ,Zivi)2+µi0+ ǫ0τi+ βEV(ri(0), τ+ 1,Xiτ+1, µi)
The value of moving out is
V1(Xiτ, ǫ1τi) = ϕ(Xiτ) + ǫ1τi.
where β is the discount factor, ϕ captures the life-cycle effect and ǫ1τ is per period
shock to the utility of moving out. We assume that since the individual is moving out of
the current housing unit, the utility of moving out is not a function of its characteristics.
Both ǫ0τi and ǫ1τi are assumed to be i.i.d. extreme value distributed.
Now, denote V¯τ the deterministic value of staying. That is,
V¯0τ(ri(),Zi, τ,Xiτ, vi) = γ1ri(0)g(τ)+
1
2
γ2[ri(0)g(τ)]2+µiτ+ βEV(ri(),Zi, τ+ 1,Xiτ+1, vi).
Similarly, let V¯1i be the deterministic value of moving out, i.e.
V¯1(Xi) = ϕ(Xi).
Then, the probability of leaving the house is
p(ri(0),Zi, τ,Xi, µi) =
exp(V¯1(Xi))
exp[V¯0i(ri(0), µi0, τ,Xi)] + exp(V¯1(Xi))
(1.1)
During the period when the individual is looking for a house, he tries to find a
housing unit that maximizes the following value function with respect to observed
housing characteristics Zi and unobserved housing characteristics vi.
EV(Xi, ui, uZ,i) = argmax{Zi ,vi}EV(ri,Zi, uZ,i, vi, ui,Xi, θ) (1.2)
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Where θ is the set of parameters to be estimated. Here, we impose a restriction that
there is only one unobserved characteristic vi. That is, if there are several unobserved
characteristics of the rental unit, individuals do not choose optimally the quantity of
each of them, and thus they can be considered as an index. Finally, we assume that the
individual’s utility shocks ui, uZ,i only get realized after she decides to move. We then
specify the deterministic value of moving out as the difference between the expected
value of a new house and the mobility cost, i.e.
ϕ(Xi) = Eui ,uZ,i [EV(Xi, ui, uZ,i)]− C(Xi)
1.2 Data
We use two waves of the French Housing Survey 2002 and 2006. The French Housing
Survey is a four years cross-section data that aims to describe the housing conditions of
the population using a representative sample. Hence it describes the characteristics of
the housing units (size, area, tenure, . . . ) and the characteristics of the individual living in
these houses (income, labor market outcome, children, . . . ) including their former mobility
(length of stay, former tenure, . . . ).
The main advantage of this data source is to locate individuals at the finest geograph-
ical level. However, the neighborhood attributes we rely on are computed from the
census, and the finest geographical level available for census data is IRIS.3 Therefore, a
neighborhood is defined as an IRIS. For the sake of reliability, we get rid of individuals
living in census blocks of less than 1,000 inhabitants.4
Our sample selection is as follows: we start with the 2002 and 2006 French Housing
Surveys. We restrict our sample to tenants from private sector and for whom the location
variable is available. This yields a sample of 12,084 households. Then we dispose of
individuals who have a family relationship with their landlord (216), individuals older
3IRIS are the basic units for the dissemination of local data. Municipalities of at least 10,000 inhabitants
and most municipalities of between 5,000 and 10,000 inhabitants are divided up to neighborhoods with a
population close to 2000 inhabitants
4Neighborhood attributes are not reliable for them.
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than 65 years (1,413), those who have been in the same dwelling for more than 30 years
(123), and individuals who have been in their house before emancipation age (123).
Finally, to reduce the level of heterogeneity between markets, we dispose of all
individuals living in rural areas (1,264).
Our final sample is composed of 8,288 individuals whose characteristics are described
in table 1.1. We measure mobility using a prospective variable that yields a mobility rate
of 24.8%, to be compared to 26% in the general population for the same sub-category.
A large fraction of the mobile households have male household heads. A small share
are either married or in cohabitations, which could mean that those households have a
high mobility costs. Mobile households tend to be younger but the number of children
is similar for mobile and nonmobile households. The ratio of immigrants is slightly
higher among mobile households. Mobile households tend to be more educated. Mobile
households tend to have smaller housing units than not mobile, which is consistent with
the life-cycle housing demand.
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Table 1.1: Description of the sample
Variables Not Mobile Mobile All
Households Households Households
Female 35.8 35.2 35.6
Married/cohab 45.6 48.7 46.4
Number of children 0 65.5 64.7 65.3
1 15.8 17.2 16.2
2 11.6 11.4 11.6
3 and more 6.9 6.7 6.9
Citizenship Native 87.0 85.9 86.7
Immigrant 13.0 14.1 13.3
Age Less than 30 34.0 44.1 36.6
30 to 39 years 25.2 30.2 26.5
40 to 49 years 20.6 15.7 19.4
50 to 64 years 19.5 9.6 17.0
65 0.7 0.4 0.6
Education Intermediate 44.6 39.7 43.4
Higher 18.1 19.1 18.4
University 37.3 41.2 38.3
Number of rooms 1 19.2 26.8 21.1
2 26.8 29.4 27.4
3 27.7 23.8 26.7
4 17.2 13.4 16.3
5 6.7 4.8 6.2
6 1.7 1.4 1.7
7 0.7 0.4 0.6
Mean rent / 100 in (e) 5.52 5.40 5.49
Number of observations 6,188 2,100 8,288
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In the next figure, we present the duration and the mobility data. The hazard
rate turns out to decrease with tenure, indicating the presence of both observed and
unobserved heterogeneity or a negative effect of decreasing rent over time on mobility.5
Figure 1.1: Estimation of the Hazard function
5The spikes at the tail of the hazard function are due to extremely low sample size in this area.
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1.3 Identification
1.3.1 The French rental market
The French rental market is characterized by a large number of regulations. As noted
by Wasmer (2005), these regulations are biased towards tenants. The major regulation
takes the form of a winter recess during which landlords have to cope with unpaid bills.
The second major characteristic, which is more of interest for our work, is related to the
presence of a rent evolution regulation. Landlords have the power to set the initial rent
of their dwelling. After the initial period, the rent evolution is given by a rent index
calculated by the French Statistical Institute (INSEE) which during our period of study,
was calculated by using the construction cost index.6 This regulation has mainly two
consequences. First, it reduces significantly the degree of uncertainty on future rents,
and hence operates as an insurance against the rent shocks. A potential implication
is to decrease the value of homeownership compared to renting. The homeownership
rate in 2006 in France, close to 56%, is lower than in most of the developed countries. 7
Second, the rent regulation creates an exogenous variation paths for relative rent that
is independent of market conditions. This is very useful in order to circumvent the
endogeneity of rent.
1.3.2 Identification of the model
The identification is based on the optimal housing choice of an individual. That is, at
the beginning of the period, an individual chooses a housing unit which maximizes her
expected utility. Let’s denote vi = v(wi). Given the data on rents and housing observed
characteristics, we can recover vi from the initial rent equation as follows.
vi = ri(0)− h(Zi)
6A change was introduced in 2006, the rent index is now based on the consumer price index for all goods
except tobacco and shelter.
7The exceptions are very specific housing markets: Germany (price fallout after reunification boom),
Netherlands (extremely high proportion of public housing).
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We then use the following F.O.C. of the optimal choice of housing characteristics.
The sensitivity of housing demand to the housing unobserved vi, and observed Zi can
be written respectively:
∂EV(ri(0),Zi, vi, uZ,i, uv,i, ui,Xi, θ)
∂vi
= −∂EV(ri(0),Zi, vi, uZ,i, uv,i, ui,Xi, θ)
∂ri(0)
∂ri(0)
∂vi
∂EV(ri(0),Zi, vi, uZ,i, uv,i, ui,Xi, θ)
∂Zi
= −∂EV(ri(0),Zi, vi, uZ,i, uv,i, ui,Xi, θ)
∂ri(0)
∂ri(0)
∂Zi
Now, notice that the same can be derived using the utility shock to marginal utility
∂EV(ri(0),Zi, vi, uZ,i, uv,i, ui,Xi, θ)
∂µiτ
= βτ
∂EV(ri(τ),Zi, vi, uZ,i, uv,i, ui,Xiτ , θ)
∂µiτ
× P(s ≥ τ, ri,Zi, vi, uZ,i, uv,i, ui,Xi)
= βτ
exp(V0τ)
exp(V0τ) + exp(V1τ)
× P(s ≥ τ, ri,Zi, vi, uZ,i, uv,i, ui,Xi)
= βτP(s > τ, ri,Zi, vi, uZ,i, uv,i, ui,Xi)
Where s is an index, and P is the moving out probability as defined before.
Hence, considering the relationship between µ and the unobserved housing charac-
teristics vi
∂EV(ri(0),Zi, vi, uZ,i, uv,i, ui,Xi, θ)
∂vi
=
T
∑
τ=1
βτP(s > τ, ri,Zi, vi, uZ,i, uv,i, ui,Xi)c(Xi,τ)× uv,iui
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Furthermore, notice from the same relationship as before
∂EV(ri(0),Zi, vi, uZ,i, uv,i, ui,Xi, θ)
∂Zi
=
T
∑
τ=1
[βτP(s > τ, ri,Zi, vi, uZ,i, uv,i, ui,Xi)× ∂b(Zi,Xi,τ, uZ,i)
∂Zi
]c(Xi,τ)ui
Therefore, assume the set of observed characteristics is of size J. We obtain for each
element j of vector Z
∑
T
τ=1[β
τP(s > τ, )× bZj(Zi,Xiτ, uZ,i)c(Xi,τ)]
∑
T
τ=1 β
τP(s > τ, )c(Xi,τ)uv,i
= hZj(Zi) (1.3)
Notice that there are J+ 1 unknown variables, uv,i, uZ,i with only J equations. Hence,
without loss of generality, we normalize uz0 to be zero. Then, uv,i can be derived
uv,i =
∑
T
τ=1 β
τP(s > τ, )× bZj(Zi,Xiτ, uZ,i)c(Xi,τ)
∑
T
τ=1 β
τP(s > τ, )c(Xi,τ)hZj(Zi)
(1.4)
Lastly, we need to derive the utility shock parameter ui.
ui = −h
′(Z)∑Tl=1 βlP(s > l, )[γ1 + γ2ri(0)g(l)]g(l)
∑
T
l=1 β
lP(s > l, )× bZ(Zi,Xiτ, uZ,i)c(Xi,l)
(1.5)
That is, substituting uv,i and ui in the specification of µ, we get
µiτ = [b(Zi,Xiτ, uZ,i) + uv,i(ri − h(Zi))]c(Xi,τ)ui
= hZj(Zi)b(Zi,Xiτ, uZ,i)c(Xi,τ)× ∑
T
l=1 β
lP(s > l, )(−γ1 − γ2ri(0)g(l)]g(l)
∑
T
l=1 β
τP(s > l, )bZj(Zi,Xi,l , uZ,i)c(Xi,l)
+[ri − h(Zi)]c(Xi,τ)× ∑
T
l=1 β
lP(s > l, )[−γ1 − γ2ri(0)g(l)]g(l)
∑
T
l=1 β
lP(s > l, )c(Xi,l)
(1.6)
Given µi,τ, we then can derive the likelihood of the dynamic discrete choice model
where the probability of moving out after tenure τ is
p(ri(),Zi,Xi, τ, µi) =
exp(V¯1(Xi))
exp[V¯0i(ri(0),Zi,Xi, τ, µi)] + exp(V¯1(Xi))
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Let us make several remarks about the above identification strategy. First, it is
the predicted change over time that identifies the rent coefficient γ. That is with a
time varying observed individual characteristics Xi,τ, and over time variation in rent,
γ1 and γ2 can be separately identified as long as the variation of g(τ) over tenure is
independent of the variation of Zi, Xi,τ. We state this formally in Lemma 1. The proof is
straightforward.
Lemma 1: If {ri0g(τ)}Tτ=1, any function of {Xi,τ}Tτ=1 and Zi are linearly independent, then
the price coefficients γ1, γ2 are identified.
Lemma 1 highlights the restriction imposed on the model specification that identifies
the price coefficient, the per period utility of staying in an apartment is not a function
of tenure. Hence, the only tenure dependency in per period utility is captured by the
variation of rent. Next, we discuss identification of the term c(X). Since in equation 8
c(X) appears both in the denominator as well as numerator multiplicatively, it is clear
that in the best case, it is identified up to a multiplicative constant. Given that, we can
see that c(X) can be identified from the over time variation of the term
ric(Xi,τ)× ∑
T
l=1 β
lP(s > l, )[−γ1 − γ2ri(0)g(l)]g(l)
∑
T
l=1 β
lP(s > l, )c(Xi,l)
This result is stated in the following Lemma, whose proof is, again straightforward.
Lemma 2: c(x) is identified up to a multiplicative constant. Lastly, we discuss the identifi-
cation of the price equation h(Z) and the utility function b(Z,X, u). We now show that h() is
identified if bj(Zi,X, uz,i) varies with X.
Proposition: Suppose that h(Z) is the price equation term for Z and bzj(Zj,Xi, uz,i) defined
as above is a nonconstant function of X and suppose that uz(Z,X) is a continuously differentiable
function of Z and X. Then, among the class of functions b˜j(Zi,X, u˜z) with the same property, h
is identified and b is identified up to a multiplicative constant.
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Proof Without loss of generality, assume that h(0) = 0, i.e. the function h does not
include a constant. Consider the part of µiτ which is a function of Zi. Then, it is
µiτ = [
T
∑
l=1
βlP(s > l, ..)[−γ1 − γ2ri(0)]g(l)]c(Xiτ)
×
[
b(Zi,Xiτ, uzi)hzj(Zj)
∑
T
l=1 β
τP(s > l, )bzj(Zi,Xil , uzi)c(Xil)
− h(Zj)
∑ βlP(s > l, )c(Xil)
]
Since on the RHS, b and bz appear in the numerator and the denominator, b is at best
identified up to a multiplicative constant. Suppose there exists h˜j() 6= hj(), bj,b˜j(),uzi,
and u˜zi, which gives the same µiτ, i.e. such that
b(Zi,Xiτ, uzi)hzj(Zj)
∑
T
l=1W(l)bzj(Zi,Xil , uzi)
− h(Zj)
∑
T
l=1W(l)
=
b˜(Zi,Xiτ, u˜zi)h˜zj(Zj)
∑
T
l=1W(l)b˜zj(Zi,Xil , u˜zi)
− h˜(Zj)
∑
T
l=1W(l)
whereW(l) ≡ βlP(s > l, )c(Xil). Thus,
h(Zj)− h˜(Zj)
∑
T
l=1W(l)
=
b(Zi,Xiτ, uzi)hzj(Zj)
∑
T
l=1W(l)bzj(Zi,Xil , uzi)
− b˜(Zi,Xiτ, u˜zi)h˜zj(Zj)
∑
T
l=1W(l)b˜zj(Zi,Xil , u˜zi)
Then,
h(Zj)− h˜(Zj)
∑
T
l=1W(l)
=
∑
T
l=1W(l)[b˜zj(Zi,Xil , u˜zi)b(Zi,Xiτ, u˜zi)hzj(Zi)− bzj(Zi,Xil , u˜zi)b˜(Zi,Xiτ, u˜zi)h˜zj(Zi)]
[∑Tl=1W(l)bzj(Zi,Xil , uzi)][∑
T
l=1W(l)b˜zj(Zi,Xil , u˜zi)]
Thus,
[
T
∑
l=1
W(l)]{
T
∑
l=1
W(l)[b˜zj(l)b(τ)hzj − bzj(l)b˜(τ)h˜zj]}
= [
T
∑
l=1
W(l)bzj(l)][
T
∑
l=1
W(l)b˜zj(l)][h(Zj)− h˜(Zj)]
Now, let Xi1,...,XiT be such that
uzi(Zi,Xi) = uzi, u˜zi(Zi,Xi) = u˜zi
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That is, Xi can vary given that uzi, u˜zi remains constant. Now, if we compare each term
involving Xil ,Xik, l 6= k, l 6= τ, k 6= τ, then
WlWk[b˜zj(l)b(τ)hzj − bzj(l)b˜(τ)h˜zj + b˜zj(k)b(τ)hzj − bzj(k)b˜(τ)h˜zj]
= 2WlWkbzj(l)b˜zj(k)[h(Zj)− h˜(Zj)]
Since the LHS term contains bzj(τ), which is a function of Xiτ whereas the RHS term
does not, and the RHS contains the cross term bzj(k)bzj(l) but the LHS does not. In order
for the above equality to hold for any Xi given z, bzj cannot be a function of X, which
contradicts the assumption and prove the proposition.
Lemma 1, 2 and the proposition summarize the identification of the model. For the
identification to work, we need the elasticity of substitution between observable and
unobservable housing characteristics to be a function of observable individual character-
istics. This is similar to the standard hedonic literature, which assumes that the marginal
rate of substitution between observed housing characteristics Zi and other consumption
goods Ci is a function of individual observed characteristics Xiτ. The restriction used
in the above identification strategy is that the rental market is competitive. That is, the
individual observed characteristics enter in the marginal rate of substitution between Zi
and vi, but not in the rent equation.
The parameters are estimated on the mobility data. That is, parameters are chosen so
that the generated unobserved heterogeneity results in per period utility that explains
best the pattern of mobility. That is, parameters should be chosen such that individuals
who stayed longer in an apartment have higher per period utility. If we can assume
that the unobserved characteristics vi are orthogonal to the observed ones, Zi, then,
similarly to the standard hedonic literature, we can identify most of the parameters of
the hedonic model without duration data, using the static hedonic model. To see this,
first consider the rent equation. With the additional orthogonality condition, we can
obtain the function h(Z) of the rent equation just by OLS. Then, if we modify equation
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(1.3) and add another term bxXi, it becomes
rvbZ(Zi,Xi)uzi + rvbxXi = h′(Zi) (1.7)
This setup is very similar to that of Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004) and Heck-
man, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2009) and other hedonic literature, where the authors show
identification of the parameters of the function rvbZ given that the utility shock uzi is
independent of Xi, and given some functional form assumptions. It is of some interest
that in static hedonic model, one can only identify the utility function parameters well if
the marginal utility function is fully flexible. One common restriction is that it is linearly
separable in Zi and Xi. However, we have shown that in dynamic hedonic models,
the utility function component b(Zi,Xi,τ) can be made more flexible. In sum, both the
hedonic optimal choice part and the dynamic discrete mobility choice part complement
each other in identifying the structural parameters and the unobserved heterogeneity of
each individual.
1.4 Estimation
We estimate the model by maximum likelihood. The likelihood function is set up as
follows. The likelihood increment for individual i who has been living in an apartment
for τ years and whose mobility decision is Im,i, is
Li = [
τ
∏
l=1
(1− Pm(l,Xi,Zi))][Im,iPm(τ + 1,Xi,Zi) + (1− Im,i)(1− Pm(τ + 1,Xi,Zi))]
where the mobility probability is defined as in equation 2. The likelihood is the product
of individual likelihood increments, i.e.
L =
N
∏
i=1
Li
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We set the parameters of the rental price equation as follows:
h(Zi) = rz1Z1i + rz2Z2i (1.8)
where Z1 is composed of the number of rooms, the mean floor area per room and
a dummy indicating whether or not the housing unit has two bathrooms. These three
variables are supposed to capture the size and the observed quality of a housing unit.
According to the urban economic theory, another important determinant of a housing
unit price is its location in the city. That is, individuals make a tradeoff between living
in the center of the city (paying a high rent) and far away from the center (paying
commuting cost). As a consequence, a rent curve can be derived that predicts that the
price is decreasing with distance to the city center. Thus, Z2 is composed of the distance
to the center and the population of the city. Hence, the population captures the constant
associated to the rent curve, while the distance seizes the slope of the curve.
The parameters of the components of the per period utility function for staying in
the apartment are specified as follows
b(Z,X) = uZ,iZi +
1
2
Z′b2Z+ XbXZ (1.9)
and we normalize one element of the vector uZ,i to be 1, and, as discussed before b1 is
normalized to 1.
Furthermore, we specify the effect of individual attributes to be
c(X) = c1 + cxX
where we also normalize c1 to be 1. The utility of moving out is specified as
ϕ0 + ϕ1log(Xi)
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The derivation of the likelihood increment for each individual i requires the computa-
tion of individual specific unobserved utility components uv,i, uZ,i and ui. Equations (1.4)
and (1.5) which show the relationship between uv,i, uZ,i, ui and the mobility probability
and other variables and parametersalso describe the fixed point that uv,i, uZ,i and ui need
to satisfy. Hence, we compute the unobserved utility components using the following
iterative algorithm.
Step 1 Given uv,i, uZ,i, ui, derive the choice probability, and thus P(s > l) for each l.
Step 2 Given P(s > l), derive the next iteration u′v,i,u
′
Z,i, u
′
i using equations (1.4) and
(1.5).
We stop the above iteration if ∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
uv,i − u′v,i
uZ,i − u′Z,i
ui − u′i
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
< δ (1.10)
Where δ is a stopping criterion close to 0. We next show that there indeed exist uv,i,
uz,i, ui that satisfy equations (1.4) and (1.5). Since P()’s on the RHS in these equations
are also functions of uv,i and ui, equations (1.4) and (1.5) describe the fixed point of the
mapping.
u′v,i =
∑
T
τ=1 β
τP(s > τ, uv,i, ui)bZJ (Zi,Xiτ, uZ,i)c(Xi,τ)
∑
T
τ=1 β
τP(s > τ, uv,i, ui)c(Xi,τ)hZJ (Zi)
(1.11)
u′i = −
hZJ (Z)∑
T
l=1 β
lP(s > l, uv,i, ui)[γ1 + γ2ri(0)g(l)]g(l)
∑
T
l=1 β
lP(s > l, uv,i, ui)bZJ (Zi,Xiτ, uZ,i)c(Xi,l)
(1.12)
Notice that since the first element of uZJ is set to zero by normalization, the above
functional form setup implies
bZJ (Zi,Xiτ, uZ,i) = bZJ (Zi,Xiτ, 0)
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Now, let
uv = argsupuv,u
∑
T
τ=1 β
τP(s > τ, uv, u)bZJ (Zi,Xiτ, 0)c(Xi,τ
∑
T
τ=1 β
τP(s > τ, uv, u)c(Xi,τ)hZJ (Zi)
(1.13)
and define uv similarly as the arginf of uv. Define u and u similarly as well. If we
assume that both the numerator and denominator of equations (1.4) and (1.5) to be
bounded from above and below from 0, then both uv, uv, and u, u are all bounded below
by zero and bounded above. Thus, the rectangular space defined by
U ≡ {(u, uv) : u ≤ u ≤ u, uv ≤ uv ≤ uv}
is compact and convex. Since the function mapping (u, uv) ∈ U to (u′, u′v) ∈ U is
well defined and continuous, it satisfies all the conditions for the Brouwer’s Fixed Point
theorem. Therefore, there exists a fixed point (u, uv) ∈ U that satisfies equations (1.4)
and (1.3).
1.5 Estimation Results
In Table 1.2, we report the Maximum likelihood estimation results of the basic model.
All thestructural parameters have the expected sign. The price coefficients γ1, for the
per period utility of staying is negative and significant. The square price coefficient γ2 is
negative and significant. The coefficient of the squared term of the number of rooms,
and mean size per room are positive and significant indicating that higher number of
rooms, and bigger rooms yield a higher utility. Moreover, the coefficient of the dummy
for two bathrooms is positive and significant but of lower magnitude than the number of
rooms. The coefficient that measures the interaction between age and number or rooms
in the utility function is negative, implying that marginal utility of number of rooms is
increasing with age that is consistent with the life-cycle theory of housing demand. The
coefficients of the utility of moving out are both significant. The coefficient of log age is
negative, which reflects the data where older people move less often.
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Finally, the coefficients in the rent equation are one would have expected.In monetary
amount, the model states that one needs 121 e for an additional room, and 111 e for
10 m2 of additional floor area while a second bathrooms cost 303 e. In terms of rent
curve, the model implies a price increase of 47 e for additional 100,000 inhabitants
while the rent decreases of 21 e for each additional kilometre . These parameters are
in contrast with the very simple version of the typical price equation estimated in the
hedonic literature. We can see that the OLS estimated coefficients are much lower, from
about 20% to 90% of the value of the coefficient estimated by ML. The ML and OLS
results imply that the unobserved housing specific heterogeneity is negatively correlated
with the observed characteristics included in this estimation.
Table 1.2: Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors
Parameters Est. S.E.
Utility Age -0.361* 0.22
Number of rooms 1.824*** 0.28
Mean size per room 0.292* 0.17
Dummy for two bathrooms 0.351*** 0.10
Price in the center 0.117 0.08
Distance to the center -0.678*** 0.04
γ1 -0.268*** 0.11
γ2 -0.001 0.002
Interactions Age × # of rooms -2.993* 1.56
Age ×Mean size per room -0.442 0.96
Age × Dummy for two bathrooms 0.276 0.34
Age × Price in the center -0.303 0.22
Age × Distance to the center 0.440*** 0.16
Rent Number of rooms 1.208*** 0.47
Mean size per room 1.118** 0.51
Dummy for two bathrooms 3.032*** 0.36
Price in the center 0.473*** 0.21
Distance to the center -0.217* 0.11
ϕ0 -1.935*** 0.51
ϕ1 -0.209*** 0.07
∗∗∗, ∗∗ et ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% et 10% level
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Table 1.3: OLS
Parameters Parameters S.E.
Const 1.11*** 0.13
Number of rooms 0.99*** 0.02
Mean size per room 0.70*** 0.04
Dummy for two bathrooms 2.12*** 0.11
Price in the center 0.22*** 0.06
Distance to the center -0.03*** 0.002
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% et 10% level
Finally, we report our estimated utility shocks and unobserved heterogeneity.
1.6 Conclusion
In this essay, we propose to estimate the parameters of the price equation and the
structural hedonic model by utilizing the tenure and mobility data of rental apartments
in France. We used the French data on rental apartments, because it has the detailed
information on tenure, i.e. length of stay in an apartmentand mobility, in addition to
the detailed information on the characteristics of the apartment and the renter. The
additional benefit of the data on French apartments are that in France, the rent is
regulated to grow at a low mandated rate, which is not related to the local housing
market. Therefore, we do not need to worry about the endogeneity of the price of rent
when we use the over time variation of rent for identification of the price coefficient.
The literature has estimated dynamic models of housing choice, and also estimated the
duration models on the tenure choice, but so far it has not explicitly used the duration
data to identify the parameters of the hedonic model.
It turns out that the coefficients of the observed housing characteristics areidentified
without the restriction that the observed and unobserved characteristics are orthogo-
nal, the assumption that is often used in estimating the hedonic model. Furthermore,
marginal utility of observed characteristics can be a flexible function of observed housing
and individual characteristics. This is in contrast to the conventional identification and
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estimation strategy of hedonic models, where marginal utility needs to be a separable
function of observed housing characteristics and the characteristics of the consumer
The estimation results demonstrate that the observed and unobserved housing
characteristics are negatively correlated, which is reasonable, since what we in general
see in France is that in expensive neighborhoods, renters live in apartments with lower
observed quality to make up for the high unobserved qualities of the neighborhood.
Failure to take into account the endogeneity bias could underestimate the true value of
the observed characteristics of housing.
An interesting direction for future researchwould be to extend the analysis of hedonic
dynamic model to explicitly include neighborhood effects. There has been much interest
in estimating the neighborhood effects in the static and dynamic hedonic literature.
However, since neighborhood unobserved heterogeneity is also part of unobserved
heterogeneity of a housing unit, we believe that the proper identification of it can be only
done as an extension of the identification and estimation of the individual unobserved
housing characteristics. This extension is left for future research.
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Figure 1.2: Distributions of utility shocks
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Essay 2
Equilibrium Effects of Local Tax
Holiday Policies in the Presence of
Search and Spatial Frictions
Introduction
Over the eighties, the unemployment rate in France rose sharply. This increase was
particularly impressive in a category of neighborhoods located in the inner cities referred
to as banlieues. Several causes exist to the high level of unemployment in the banlieues
such as inadequate qualification or discrimination.1 However, the hypothesis of spatial
mismatch seems credible to the government because of the disconnection between the
banlieues and the job centers. This problem was exacerbated by the lack of public
services, more specially, public transit.
In 1996, the French government launched a large scale Enterprise Zones policy which
takes the form of a territorial positive action towards banlieues including a labeling
into Zones Urbaines Sensibles (ZUS), Zones de Redynamisation Urbaine (ZRU) and Zones
1Back to the seventies, these locations had been the favorite implantation of large public housing projects
because of the low land prices. As a consequence, the former locations had host the majority of incoming
immigrants, and individuals with low income.
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Franches Urbaines (ZFU). Here I pay attention to the Enterprise Zones policy hereafter
FEZ or ZFU designed to offers tax breaks to the companies who create a production unit
in these locations.
Fifteen years after the introduction of the policy, its effectiveness need to be assessed.
Over the period from 1995 and 2008 the net attractiveness of the locations subject to
the policy was about 24.4 to be compared to 6.4 for locations not subject to the policy.2
As a consequence, the stock of firms located in ZFUs doubled from about 26,000 to
52,000. Meanwhile, following the path of the business cycle, the unemployment rate
decreased by 20.6 % in ZFUs while it was decreasing by 27.7 % in the rest of France.
These observations suggest an effectiveness in terms of firms attraction that has not
translated into a lower unemployment rate. As a consequence, one can assume that the
mechanism in play may be far more complex than spatial mismatch.
This essay contributes to the evaluation of tax holiday policies, but starts with the
idea that the labor market is characterized by considerable frictions (Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1999; Rogerson and Shimer, 2011). The existence of frictions may shape our
understanding of programs like the French Enterprise Zones.
The existing evaluations of the policy have focused on the growth of the number of
firms by using quasi experimental methods (Rathelot and Sillard, 2007), and the hazard
rate out of unemployment (Gobillon, Magnac, and Selod, 2007). They both reported a
slightly positive effect of the ZFU policy.
However, the standard policy evaluation literature may not be the right framework
to analyze the policy since it assumes that individuals not treated by the program would
have the same outcome as non-participants if the program was implemented more
widely. Several pieces of evidence suggest the violation of the former assumption.
In the case of the French Enterprise Zones, it is unrealistic to assume that the agents
will not modify their behavior following a change in the behavior of firms. Indeed, in
the most basic setup, inhabitants of the treated areas may modify their reservation wage
to account for the decrease in commuting cost induced by the relocation of firms. Thus, a
2I define the net attractiveness as the ratio between implantation and stock.
38
Essay 2. Equilibrium Effects of Local Tax Holiday Policies in the Presence of Search and Spatial Frictions
general equilibrium effect may exist andmodify the wage distribution. As a consequence,
the fundamental assumption of the standard policy evaluation is violated. Moreover,
as we will see later, a comparison between a treated and a non-treated locations may
provide useless outcomes because of the high level of residential mobility observed in
the treated locations after the policy introduction.
Model-based policy evaluations have been popular recently in equilibrium search
theory. Mortensen and Pissarides (2001) consider a variety of tax policies in equilibrium
search theory. Others examples include Van der Linden (2005) or Cahuc and Le Barban-
chon (2010) who proposed equilibrium search models for policy evaluation purpose.
However, these models have been calibrated following the macroeconomic literature
and calibration is an effective tool prior to policy introduction. In this case, I can rely
on individual data to estimate the effects of the policy. Following this intuition, Lise,
Seitz, and Smith (2003) develop and estimate a search model to analyze the effects of the
Canadian Self-Sufficiency project. In the first part, they estimate a partial equilibrium
model of job search. The obtained parameters are combined with calibrated parame-
ters to assess the potential general equilibrium effects of a large scale introduction of
the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project. I extent into that direction while carrying full
estimation and adapt it to the French Enterprise Zones.
The existing estimated equilibrium search models use the stationary unemployment
rate to infer about individual probability to be unemployed (van den Berg and Ridder,
1998; Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002).3 However, as noted by Wasmer and Zenou (2004)
these models are designed as spaceless markets even in presence of clear evidence of
impacts of space on labor market outcomes.
As a consequence, a large body of literature has tried to include space into job search
models modeling jointly spatial and search frictions. Coulson, Laing, and Wang (2001)
have been the first to use a theoretical model to generate differential of unemployment
3The first estimated equilibrium search model is due to Eckstein and Wolpin (1995), a survey of the
literature is presented by Eckstein and van den Berg (2007). Current trends in the literature extend the
search equilibrium to allow for experience accumulation (Adda et al., 2010), and account for the effect
policy intervention
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rate across locations as stated by the spatial mismatch hypothesis. Their underlining
assumption is that some individuals are willing to accept longer commuting. They also
consider heterogeneity in firms entry cost between locations. The main drawback of
such an approach is that the spatial distortion is moved to the firm’s side. Several other
papers attempted to produce unemployment rate differentials using several features:
search effort (Smith and Zenou, 2003) and lowmatching rate due to the distance between
residential and working location (Wasmer and Zenou, 2004). Another example includes
Brueckner and Zenou (2003) who assume discrimination that prevent blacks to settle in
the suburbs regardless of their willingness to pay. Then, they analyze its effect on wage
and unemployment.
This literature concludes that when spatial mismatch is modeled within an equilib-
rium job search theory, it provides a powerful tool to understand the dynamic of search
in presence of commuting between locations, and hence the dynamic of unemployment
across locations.
I build upon Mortensen (1998), Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (1999) and Was-
mer and Zenou (2004). Thus, my model contributes to the empirical equilibrium search
literature by implementing a wage posting model with an accurate representation of the
FEZ policy. As in Bontemps, Robin, and van den Berg (1998), I allow for heterogeneity
in the productivity of firms. I borrow the spatial structure of Wasmer and Zenou (2004)
even though this model is less rich for the sake of the future estimation. And following
Mortensen (1998), I endogeneize job offer rate as a function of the market aggregate
and the physical distance between the location of firms and individuals. Finally, both
individuals and firms are allowed to move as a response to the policy.
In contrast to the usual controlled experiments, the FEZ policy was designed for
firms. Even though the ultimate goal was to modify individual prospects on the labor
market, it seems inconceivable to evaluate the individual behavior without paying
attention to firms’ response to the policy. Hence, I develop a firm location choice model
that allows me to recover the distribution of firms’ productivity across locations. Thus, I
am able to analyze the impact of the policy on the location of firms.
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I take this model into estimation using a hierarchical Bayesian MCMC, flexibly
allowing for location fixed effects both on the firm and individual side. This literature
draws its data from the French Labor Survey from 2003 to 2008. The major feature of the
data is that it allows to locate individuals at the finest geographical level. In addition, I
use an administrative database that keeps tracks of firms located in ZUS and ZFUs since
the policy introduction.
The rest of this essay is organized as follows. In the first section, I present the policy,
in the second, the behavioral model. The third is devoted to the presentation of the data
and the estimation strategy. Finally, I present the results and a decomposition of the job
offer rate.
2.1 The French Enterprise Zones Policy
After the second world war, and following the 1954 hard winter, the French government
invested massively in public housing units. In order to reduce the cost of land, and in
need for large amount of available land, the majority of public housing was built into
the inner suburbs. The inner suburbs, like any suburbs, were disconnected from the
center of the cities. Thereafter the public housing unit will host incoming immigrants
and low income households. Later, the mix of race, poverty and the lack of public transit
contributed to rising segregation that the government tried to tackle as soon as the early
eighties. In the aftermath of the 1979 energy crisis, the national unemployment rate rose
from 4% in 1979 to 9% in 1986. This increase in unemployment deepened the disparities
between neighborhoods.
According to the 1990 census, the inhabitants of the inner suburbs experienced a
higher level of unemployment with more than 20% instead of less than 10% in the rest
of the country. Moreover, the proportion of households below poverty line was high:
26.5% instead of 9% in the rest of the country.
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The French government passed in 1991 a bill empowering the local authorities to take
the needed steps in the housing market to create an effective "social mixity".4 Besides
the law suggested to take measures in order to help businesses create more production
units into the banlieues, to improve the quality of public transit, and to guarantee the
safety of individuals.
In 1996, the government decided that the 1991 bill was surpassed by the magnitude
of the segregation and that additional steps were required. The general goal was to
overcome segregation on two fronts: first, by attracting more working-class families
into the neighborhoods in order to change the social composition; second, by attracting
more businesses into these neighborhoods and then overcome the potential spatial
mismatch. The government instituted a territorial discrimination policy that provides
fiscal incentives to firms that were or will be located into these areas. Prior to the policy
introduction, an index of socio-demographic difficulties was created, based on
• The population of the area
• The proportion of young people (less than 25 years old)
• The unemployment level
• The proportion of unskilled workers
• The municipality fiscal potential
The government created 751 sensitive urban zones (ZUS) after consultations with
local authorities. Among these ZUS, the 416 neighborhoods with the highest value of the
index are identified to face particular difficulties and are promoted urban renewal zones
(ZRU). Finally, 44 areas with the highest value of index, and hence the worst conditions
were promoted Free Urban Areas (FEZs for French Enterprise Zones in the following).
They constitute the first generation of ZFUs. In 2004, 41 second generation ZFUs were
set up. Finally in 2006, a third generation of ZFUs was created that complete to 100 the
4The law of city orientation was voted in 1991, very little is known about its application and effectiveness.
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total number of ZFUs. The fiscal advantages induced by the policy are summarized in
Table 2.1.
The cost originally estimated to 120 millions e has increased to 360 millions e in
2001 before reaching more than 570 millions e in 2006. In front of these huge costs, the
question arises how the policy affected individuals’ and firms’ behavior. In this essay, I
will try to shed new light on the effect of the policy.
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Table 2.1: Policy Description
Tax Definition ZRU ZFU
Local
business
tax
3.5 % of the physi-
cal asset
Firms with a tax-
able amount lower
thane125,198. Full exemp-
tion during the first two
years, then 75 %, 50 % and
25 % the following three
years
Firms with a taxable
amount lower than
e337,713. then 60 % the
following three years, 40 %
the additional three years
and 20 % the following
three years
Corporate
taxes
33.3 % of the
profit
Firms with a taxable
amount lower than
e225,000 on a 3 years
period. Full exemption
during the first years, then
60 % the following three
years, 40 % the additional
three years and 20 % the
following three years
Firms with a taxable
amount lower than
e100,000 + e5,000 for each
new hired employee. Full
exemption during the first
five years, then 60 % the
following three years, 40 %
the additional three years
and 20 % the following
three years
Payroll
taxes
40 % of the gross
wage paid by the
firm
Only for firms with less
than 50 employees, and
inapplicable for workers
who earn more than 1.5
times the minimum wage.
Full exemption during the
first two years, then 75 %,
50 % and 25 % the follow-
ing three years
Only for firms with less
than 50 salaries, and inap-
plicable for workers who
earn more than 1.4 times
the minimum wage. Full
exemption during the first
years, then 60 % the follow-
ing three years, 40 % the
additional three years and
20 % the following three
years
Property
taxes
Full exemption during the
first five years
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2.2 Labor market setup
In this section I describe the behavioral model used to study the impact of the FEZ policy.
The model is formulated in discrete time, and I assume stationarity. Space is continuous
and individuals are allowed to migrate and commute.
2.2.1 Workers strategy and space configuration
I consider a continuum of local labor markets indexed by l = 1 . . . L. Each local labor
market corresponds to a metropolitan area. A local labor market consists of a central
location denoted A, and of an inner suburb denoted Z that is subject to the policy. When
located in l1, I denote by C the other locations l−1. In order to keep the model tractable
and realistic, I assume that an individual cannot live and work into different markets,
but inside a market, agents can live and work in different locations. In what follows, I
suppress l from of the notations, because every metropolitan area is treated as a separate
market and data across markets are not pooled together in the estimation.
I consider a market in which a measure m = mA +mZ of agents faces a measure of
firms n = nA + nZ. Agents maximize the utility flow over the life-cycle, approximated
by the expected steady state future income discounted at exogenous and constant rate β.
When working and living locations differ, individuals have to incur a commuting cost θ,
that I will describe in detail later.
Agents may be either employed or unemployed, and these states are indexed by
e, and u. Unemployed agents receive an unemployment benefit b. Job destruction is
nationwide at rate δ. When unemployed, job offers accrue at rate λu. On the job search
is allowed and the arrival rate of offers to on-the-job searchers is λe.
Workers differ with respect to their observed skill level. The labor market is seg-
mented allowing for a specific unemployment equilibrium for each skill specific sub-
market. I face a trade-off regarding the total number of skill levels to include in the
model. A high number of skill category will be subject to finite sample issue, while a
small number may pool together individuals who do not belong to the same sub-market.
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In the empirical section, I will present the specification for the number of individual
types. I assume for now that there are K types of individuals in the population.
I can now move on to the dynamics of employment across locations. The job offer
rate estimated by the model is the rate at which vacancies are filled. In the absence of
spatial frictions, one would have expected the unemployment rate to be similar across
locations. However, there is a clear difference between unemployment rates in city
centers and inner suburbs.
I model several channels allowing for such a situation. First, I assume that there are
agglomeration externalities on the firm’s side, that result in a difference between the
total number and the mean productivity of firms located in A and Z. Furthermore, I
posit that there are informational and search frictions resulting in a lower job arrival
rate when the firm and individual locations differ. This effect is strengthened by the
difference in the number of firms in each location.
Assumption Job offers can accrue from firms located in A, Z and from other local labor
markets C. The job offers rate for inhabitants in A can be written
λA = λAA + λZA + λCA (2.1)
where λAA, λZA and λCA are respectively the job offers from firms located in A, Z
and C toward workers living in A.
For the policy evaluation purpose, the job offer rate has to be somewhat endogenous
in the model. I leave until the next section the analysis of the job arrival rate when the
reader will be familiar with the strategy of firms.
Assumption In order to commute from location A to Z, individuals must incur a fixed
cost ψ0, and a variable cost that is function of the distance between job and home location
ψ(d). The location Z is considered small enough to set ψZZ = 0, while ψAA(d) = ψ(d).
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Finally, the effective commuting cost is:
ψAZ(d) = ψZA(d) = ψ0 + ψ(d) (2.2)
The rationale for this assumption is the existence of a toll ψ0 between locations A
and Z. Location Z is small enough to generate no mobility cost.
I adopt the convention that F(w) denotes the probability that a wage offer is smaller
or equal to w. As a consequence, workers sample a wage from the distribution F which
has support [w,w]. I assume that w is the minimum wage, and define F¯ ≡ 1− F.
In this framework, firms are not allowed to discriminate among workers depending
on their location. However, it will be clear from the next section, that the wage offer
distributions are to be different across locations because of the truncation in productivity
between firms in A and Z induced by the policy. I denote by FA(w) and FZ(w) the wage
offers of firms in A, and Z. In line with the same reasoning, but also because of the
transit cost, there must be a difference between the earning distributions GA(w) and
GZ(w) will be different.
Finally, individuals are allowed to migrate. As we will see later, the data does not
allow me to follow individuals over locations. Then, the motives for moving and the
subsequent employment spells are not known. I do not make any assumption about the
motives nor about the subsequent spell. However, I model individual decision in such a
way that I can recover a neighborhood fixed effect.
Assumption I denote γij the residential mobility rate location i to j.
2.2.2 Firm strategy
In this subsection, I introduce the behavior of firms in order to have an equilibrium
model. As in Burdett and Mortensen (1998), I assume a wage posting strategy. Firms
are exogenous with regard to the sector in which they operate and they compete for
skill-specific agents. Agents of different types are not substitutable. Each firm operates a
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technology function with a specific skill requirement. Firms differ in their exogenously
determined productivity q. The cumulative distribution of firm productivity is denoted
by Γ which is continuous on its support [q, q].
The central issue is how to capture at the same time the initial repartition of firms
and the mobility behavior in some sectors. Suppose the productivity level q can be
decomposed into a firm specific component p and a location specific component µ.
The economic content of µ can be summarized as follows: when a large number of
firms is located into an area, it will generate a high value of µ and attract more firms.
As a consequence, µ can be thought of an agglomeration effect, but also an index of
development lowering firms’ entry cost.
The static profit function is given by:
π(w, tc, tp, tb) =
[
1− tc
]
∑
K
[
pk + µ− [1+ tp]wk
]
lk(wk)− [1+ tb]c(p, µ) (2.3)
Where tc, tp and tb are the corporate, payroll and business tax rates. c(p, µ) is a func-
tion that approximates the amount of capital needed by the firm to have a productivity
p and to benefit from µ. 5 lk(w) defines the number of type k workers, a firm can expect
to hire by offering a wage w. I assume that the firm-specific productivity component is
fixed over time, but the pk differ across K. The policy operates as follows, for the firms
located in Z, the taxation rates can be set to 0 under some constraints. In order to be
eligible to the policy, a firm must have less than 50 employees. Then, for the other taxes
cuts, the amount is capped. These conditions are summarized in the next equations.
5This expression is introduced to bound the demand for µ.
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l ≤ 50
w ≤ 1.4 · w
1
3
· π˜ ≤ 100, 000
0.03 · c(p, µ) ≤ sr
Prior to the policy introduction, the firm problem was to choose the level of wage, w
and µ that maximize its profit. The policy introduces a distortion, that is, in the region of
the policy constraint parameters, firms may find it more profitable to bind the policy
constraints instead of maximizing their profit.
A likely situation is that for some types of individuals, the following relation holds:
wk > 1.4w. As a consequence, the policy will by design rule out the highest productivity
and the biggest firms.
2.2.3 Matching and equilibrium
I now endogenize the job arrival rate. A firm that has not reached its optimal size l∗
opens up a vacancy and post a wage. All the wage offers are processed into a matching
function and the job offer rates are derived. The job offer rate from firms in j towards
workers in i is defined as follows
λji = M(U j,Ui,N j,Ni,ψij) (2.4)
where ψij summarizes the spatial and information frictions between i and j. I assume
here that the job arrival rate depends on the tension in the market, the number of firms,
and the spatial frictions. One can expect the following relationships to hold
∂λij
∂U
< 0
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∂λij
∂N
> 0
∂λij
∂ψij
< 0
2.2.3.1 Individual choices
Before moving to the labor market dynamics, I focus on the reservation wage strategy. In
the standard job search theory, the reservation wage equalizes the values of employment
and unemployment. What I need to emphasize more is the trade-off between jobs
located at different distances from the individual’s residential location. The choice is not
only based on the wage offer, but also on the transit cost. I define r(w) as the indifference
wage that makes an individual living in A and working for the wage w, indifferent
between accepting a job in A at distance d and a job located in Z at distance d′:
w− ψ(d) = r(w)− ψ0 − ψ(d′) (2.5)
This relationship describes the link between the wages an individual may accept
across locations.
Several features of the model need to be pointed out to be able to write the unemploy-
ment equilibrium. The timing is important to understand the next equations. At each
period, an individual decides whether to move or not. Independently of the mobility
decision, she may receive a job offer from other locations. I consider the outcomes of
the labor market at the steady state. I evaluate the equilibrium just after the potential
mobility. At this time, mobile individuals have not yet received any job offer at the same
rate as the inhabitants of their destination.
I evaluate equilibrium at the level of the local labor market, and derive equilibrium
for each location. I suppose that the population is stationary. Hence, the following
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equality holds:
m = mA +mB =
(
1− γAC − γAZ)mA + γZAmZ + γCAmC︸ ︷︷ ︸
Population in A
+
(
1− γZC − γZA)mZ + γAZmA + γCZmC︸ ︷︷ ︸
Population in Z
=
(
1− γAC)mA + γCAmC + (1− γZC)mZ + γCZmC
Assume now that the unemployment rate is stationary in the labor market:
u = uA + uZ =
(
1− γAC)(1− λAAu − λZAu )uA + δ(1− γAC)(mA − uA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non mobile unemployed in A
+
(
1− γZC)(1− λAZu − λZZu )uZ + δ(1− γZC)(mZ − uZ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non mobile unemployed in Z
+ γCA
[
(1− λACu )uC + δ(mC − uC)
]
+ γCZ
[
(1− λZCu )uC + δ(mC − uC)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Flow of new unemployed after mobility
Rearranging the equation 2.6 yields:
uA
[
1− (1− γAC)[1− λAAu − λZAu + δ]] = uZ[(1− γZC)[1− λZZu − λAZu − δ]− 1]
+δ
[[
(1− γCA)mA + γACmC
]
+
[
(1− γCZ)mZ + γZCmC
]]
+uC
[
γCA(1− λACu ) + γCZ(1− λZCu )− δ(γCA + γCZ)
]
In equation (2.6), both mA and mZ can be replaced by their corresponding expres-
sions.
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After few steps of algebra, I can derive the unemployment rates in location A and Z.
uA
mA
=
δ[
1− (1− γAC)[1− λAAu − λZAu + δ]] (2.6)
+
δmZ + uZ
[
(1− γZC)[1− λZZu − λAAu + δ]− 1]
mA
[
1− (1− γAC)[1− λAAu − λZAu + δ]]
+
uC
[
γCA(1− λACu ) + γCZ(1− λZCu )− δ(γCA + γCZ)
]
mA
[
1− (1− γAC)[1− λAAu − λZAu + δ]]
uZ
mZ
=
δ[
1− (1− γZC)[1− λZZu − λAZu + δ]] (2.7)
+
δmA + uA
[
(1− γAC)[1− λAAu − λZAu + δ]− 1]
mZ
[
1− (1− γZC)[1− λZZu − λAAu + δ]]
+
uC
[
γCA(1− λACu ) + γCZ(1− λZCu )− δ(γCA + γCZ)
]
mZ
[
1− (1− γZC)[1− λZZu − λAAu + δ]]
First, it should be noted that unemployment rates are symmetric across locations.
Indeed, it is the discrepancy between the job offer rates that allow to have different
unemployment rates. The unemployment rate can be decomposed into three compo-
nents. The first part of the expression is similar to the classical unemployment rate in the
absence of mobility. The only difference lies in the need to take into account the mobility
flow. The two other parts of the formula are due to the interactions between markets:
individuals’ mobility within and between markets.
Once equilibrium unemployment is recovered, I move to the relationship between
the earnings distribution and the wage offer distribution. I assume that wage offer
distributions are different across locations. Indeed, a notable consequence of the firm
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location model is the induced segmentation between firms in the location A and Z. That
is, the firms targeted by the policy are somewhat small and have a lower productivity.
This will result into a distinction between the gross wage offered by firms in A and Z.
As a consequence, the distributions of earnings across locations will be different. Fur-
thermore, the commuting costs, and the allocation of individuals along sectors deepens
the difference between earning distributions in the two locations. The distribution of
earnings is recovered by decomposing the contribution of newly hired workers, job
destructions and out of unemployment. For each of those elements, the expression
can be decomposed between non mobile households, individuals mobile within the
local market and the individuals coming from another local labor market. The flow of
employed workers with a wage lower than w in A can be written:
[1− γAC − γAZ]
[
λAAu F
A(w) + λZAu F
Z(w)
]
uA︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non mobile workers who find a job
+ γZAGZ(w)[mZ − uZ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Housing market mobility only
+ γZA
[
λAZu F
A(w) + λZZu F
Z(w)
]
uZ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ γCA
[
[λACu F
A(w) + λZCu F
Z(w)]uC +
[
λACe F
A(w) + λZCe F
Z(w)
]
[mC − uC]GC(w)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mobile to A after receiving a job offer
=
[
λAAe F¯
A(w) + λZAe F¯
Z(w)
]
[mA − uA]GA(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Flow of workers in A with a wage higher than w
+ δ[mA − uA]GA(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Job losses
The former equation defined the equality between the flow into the stock (left side) to
the flow out of the stock (right side). The expression is different from the one of the
former literature because of the mobility flows. More precisely, in the inflow to the stock,
I need to take into account the mobility from location Z, and the rest of space.
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The corresponding expression for the sub-market Z can be written:
[1− γZC − γZA]
[
λAZu F
A(w) + λZZu F
Z(w)
]
uZ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non mobile workers who find a job
+ γAZGA(w)[mZ − uA]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Housing market mobility only
+ γAZ
[
λAAu F
A(w) + λZAu F
Z(w)
]
uA︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ γCZ
[
[λACu F
A(w) + λZCu F
Z(w)]uC + λACe F
A(w) + λZCe F
Z(w)[mC − uC]GC(w)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mobile to Z after receiving a job offer
=
[
λAAe F¯
A(w) + λZAe F¯
Z(w)
]
[mA − uA]GA(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Flow of workers in A with a wage higher than w
+ δ[mA − uA]GA(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Job losses
The former two equations define an equilibrium for each submarket. Furthermore, I
impose an equilibrium at the local labor market level which requires the equilibrium
wage offer distributions to be solution of the system formed by these two equations:
 A1F
A(w) + A2F
Z(w) = A3
A4F
A(w) + A5F
Z(w) = A6
(2.8)
54
Essay 2. Equilibrium Effects of Local Tax Holiday Policies in the Presence of Search and Spatial Frictions
where
A1 = [1− γAZ − γAC]
[
λAAu u
A
]
+ λAAe [m
A − uA]GA(w) + γZAλAZu uZ
+γCA
[
λACu u
C + λACe [m
C − uC]GC(w)
A2 = [1− γAZ − γAC]
[
λZAu u
A
]
+ λZAe [m
A − uA]GA(w) + γZAλZZu uZ
+γCA
[
λZCu u
C + λZCe [m
C − uC]GC(w)
A3 = δ[m
A − uA]GA(w)− γZA[mZ − uZ]GZ(w)
+[λAAe + λ
ZA
e ][m
A − uA]GA(w)
A4 = [1− γZA − γZC]
[
λAZu u
Z
]
+ λZZe [m
Z − uZ]GZ(w) + γAZλZAu uA
+γCZ
[
λZCu u
C + λZCe [m
C − uC]GC(w)
A5 = [1− γZA − γZC]
[
λAZu u
Z
]
+ λAZe [m
Z − uZ]GZ(w) + γAZλZZu uZ
+γCZ
[
λACu u
C + λACe [m
C − uC]GC(w)
A6 = δ[m
Z − uZ]GZ(w)− γAZ[mA − uA]GA(w)
+[λAZe + λ
ZZ
e ][m
Z − uZ]GZ(w)
As a consequence, FA and FZ are obtained as:
FA(w) =
A3A5 − A6A2
A1A5 − A4A2 (2.9)
FZ(w) =
A3A4 − A6A1
A2A4 − A5A1 (2.10)
This equilibrium wage distribution is consistent with the former literature. That is,
for each location there is a nonlinear relationship between the earnings distribution and
the wage offer distributions of the firms located either in A and Z.
I now turn my attention to the individual mobility scheme. Individuals make mobil-
ity decision according to a simple static discrete choice model. That is, the individual
chooses between the following options:
55
Essay 2. Equilibrium Effects of Local Tax Holiday Policies in the Presence of Search and Spatial Frictions

Vi0 = du
[
λiu
]
+ [1− du]
[
λie + λ
i
u
]
+ ξ i
V
j
1 = du
[
λ
j
u
]
+ [1− du]
[
λ
j
e + λ
j
u
]
+ ξ j −mc1
V
j
2 = du
[
λ
j
u
]
+ [1− du]
[
λ
j
e + λ
j
u
]
+ ξ j −mc2
(2.11)
Where Vi0 indicates the value of staying in the same housing unit, V
j
1 denotes the
value of moving to a neighborhood j but staying in the same city while V j2 is the value
associated to a mobility into a neighborhood j in a different market. du is a dummy
indicating whether or not the individual is unemployed. In this setup, modelling
the mobility within the same location would require a more comprehensive model of
housing demand. The data does not allow me to do so. As a consequence, I do not
consider within location migration. ξi is an indirect utility function associated with
living in i.6 I treat it as an unobserved neighborhood component that is estimated. The
former mobility decisions yield different mobility costs mc. I will specify the mobility
cost to depend on the physical distance between the current and the next location, and
the size of the housing unit.
2.2.3.2 Firm choices and productivity
In the static framework and in the absence of a location choice, a relationship between
wages and productivity can be derived by taking ∂π∂w = 0.
I assume here that the problem is not only to choose a level of wage, but also a
location strategy. That is, a firm will choose its posted wage w and a location with a
specific µ that maximizes its profit.7 One would be interested also in the dynamics of
firm mobility. More precisely, how firms will react to the end of the policy.
Therefore, I develop a dynamic model of firm’s location. For the sake of simplicity,
assume there is no wage renegotiation, and the productivity p is In equation (2.6), both
mA and mZ can be replaced by their corresponding expression fixed overtime. Each
6I assume that this unobserved effect captures the difference between the utility of living into a neigh-
borhood and the associated cost.
7There is a large number of firms’ relocations over time. The motives of such mobilities are complex
and are beyond the scope of this work. The introduction of location specific terms allow to capture this
behavior with a minimum assumption.
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period, the firm posts the wage that satisfies its FOC, and decides whether to move
or not. When a firm decides to move, it has to select which of the policy constraints
it wants to comply to. As a consequence, the set of choice is extended to eight cases
corresponding to the combinations of all the alternatives.8 The value function of a given
choice j is
V(j) = V¯(j) + βEV(J ) + ǫ1j
where V¯(j) is the deterministic profit function under alternative j, EV(J ) the ex-
pected value function over the choice set J and ǫ1j an error term. Assuming the error
terms are extreme value distributed, it follows that the probability to make a specific
choice k over the set of choices J is given by:
Pr(j,w, µ) =
V¯j
∑j∈J V¯j
Finally, one needs to make sure that the skill specific labor force of firms at each wage
wk is equal to the effective labor supply at wk.9 That is, lA and lZ solve for the equality
between entry into and exit from unemployed:
NAlA(w)dFA(w) = αAA
[
mA − uA]dGA(w) + αZA[mZ − uZ]dGZ(w) (2.12)
NZlZ(w)dFZ(w) = αAZ
[
mA − uA]dGA(w) + αZZ[mZ − uZ]dGZ(w) (2.13)
Where αij is a weight for individuals living in i and working in j. Both lA(w) and
lZ(w) are obtained as:
8Payroll tax cuts, business tax cuts, corporate tax cuts, payroll and business tax cuts, payroll and
corporate tax cuts, corporate and business tax cuts, payroll, business and corporate tax cuts, and finally any
tax cuts.
9Market segmentation holds here, allowing to write an equilibrium condition for each type k. As a
consequence, I drop the type index.
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lA(w) = αAA
mA − uA
NA
dGA(w)
dFA(w)
+ αZA
mZ − uZ
NA
dGZ(w)
dFA(w)
lZ(w) = αAZ
mA − uA
NA
dGA(w)
dFA(w)
+ αZZ
mZ − uZ
NA
dGZ(w)
dFA(w)
2.3 Data
In order to estimate this model, one would have needed a history of individual labor
market status, along with residential and working place locations. The analysis of
firm location choices and productivity requires firm level data with location at a fine
geographical level, and information about firms attributes (size, costs, output). Such a
dataset does not exist. As a consequence, I derive the estimation variables from several
sources.
In the following, I first present the individual data source and its limitations. I then
present how I overcome some limitations using census data. And finally, I present the
firm data.
On the individual side, the major issue is related to the lack of a dataset that records at
the same time job status and residential mobility. The primary data source is the French
Labor survey (FLS) waves from 2003 to 2008. The survey is conducted on a continuous
basis (each 3 months) and individuals are interviewed six times. The FLS provides a
sequence of labor market states and the corresponding sojourn times. Moreover, I am
able to locate individuals and their working place at the finest geographical level, that is
the census block or Ilot. In order to achieve identification of the parameters of interest, I
need to observe a large number of transitions in the data. Given the length of the panel,
I try to maximize individual presence in the sample while keeping the model estimable.
I keep for appendix the precise data selection procedure, and for the next subsection
the description of the final sample.
Still, there is an issue on the individual side related to the missing of mobility
information in the FLS. I use mobility rates computed from the French Permanent
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Demographic Survey (FPDS). The FPDS follows 1% of the population over several waves
of the census and records any modification in the family size (birth, death, marriage,
divorce) from an additional administrative source. 10 Hence, I can document the mobility
pattern using this data source, and are able to compute the mobility rate needed for
the estimation. However, a change in the methodology of the census complicated the
computation of the transitionmatrix. That is, breakingwith the tradition of an exhaustive
population census every ten years, the French Statistical Office introduced in 2004 a new
sampling method based on annual surveys. In the biggest municipalities, which are of
interest here, the new census surveys every year 8% of the housing units. The survey is
conducted over a period of 5 years, with the ultimate aim to produce a census data with
40 % of the population every 5 years. Since the FPDS is a collection of census individuals,
it is likely that the full sample will not be observed between 2004 and 2009 . More details
are provided in appendix, and I describe in the next section the mobility pattern derived
from the data.
Finally, the firm mobility estimation employs administrative data sources. All busi-
nesses and their local units in France are registered in a national business register called
SIRENE or "Système national d’Identification du Répertoire des Entreprises et de leurs
Etablissements". The information contained in SIRENE are obtained on the basis of
documents transmitted to the centres for business creation. The information are updated
every year based on fiscal and other administrative data. Hence, the dataset provides
for each firm its year of creation, sector and location at a fine geographical level. Unfor-
tunately, in the dataset I have been granted access to, the basic firm’s characteristics are
missing. As a consequence, I use SIRENE for a descriptive perspective, since it recorded
the mobility and creation, but estimation is carried on DADS etablissements. DADS or
Annual Declaration of Social Data, is an administrative dataset that containedmandatory
declaration of companies workforce and wages.11 Thus, a DADS is a declaration for one
10The survey considers individuals born between the first and the fourth of October, and new immigrants
respecting this criteria.
11"This document that is common to tax and social administrations, employers, including government
administrations and establishments, annually supply, for each establishment, the salaries they have paid,
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employee. DADS etablissements is obtained by appending all the DADS at firm level.
The dataset obtained is a subset of SIRENE with the needed information. To summarize,
the DADS etablissements provides the basic firms characteristics while SIRENE allows to
locate firms and records a potential mobility.
I can now move to the description of the empirical content of the data.
2.3.1 Descriptive analysis
In this section, I provide the descriptive analysis of the data. I start by describing the
sample of individuals from the FLS. After having described their basic attributes, I
investigate the nature of the transitions in the labor market. Then, I present some facts
about migration, comparing treated and non treated areas. Finally, the mobility of firms
is described in the last subsection.
2.3.1.1 Individual level
The final sample is composed of 13,231 individuals with 6.8% of the sample located in a
policy area. This rate is higher than the one observed in the general population 2.4%.
The table 2.2 describes the cities used for the analysis, and their corresponding sample
size. The metropolitan area of Paris represent 46.4% of the sample. Finally, 1.5% of the
sample work in a ZFU. This rate moves from approximatively 6.6% in Calais to 0.8% in
Lyon.
I can move to a more detailed description of the sample. The Table 2.3 reports the
basic characteristics of the individuals in the sample. Both FEZs and ZUS have larger
share of young individuals than the other parts of the cities. In comparison to the
other locations, the FEZs denote more families with a male head and less individuals
living in partnership. A great deal of these families are immigrant, 26.4% in FEZs to
be compared to 14.7% in the sample. 12 Not surprisingly, the individuals with an
the employed workforce and a nominative list of their employees, indicating the amount of wages received
by each one".
12The working population is constituted of individuals active in the labor market, and living into
metropolitan areas. This is the reason why the share of immigrants is large.
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Table 2.2: Samples per location
Metropolitan Number of Number of Number of Share of individuals
Areas Individuals Individuals in A Individuals in Z Working in a ZFU
Beauvais 114 75 39 1.4
Besançon 544 469 75 1.5
Bordeaux 1,249 1,098 151 3.6
Calais 263 186 77 6.6
Lyon 1,675 1,637 38 0.9
Le Mans 822 751 71 0.8
Marseille 1,412 1,371 41 2.1
Paris 6,136 5,843 293 1.0
Toulon 544 487 57 2.0
Troyes 472 407 65 1.5
Number of observations 13,231 12,324 907 169
associate or college degree account for 15% of the individuals located in a FEZs while
they represent around 35% of the general population. This education gap translates into
highly stylized occupations and lower wages. Virtually 75% of FEZs inhabitants are
either unskilled manual workers or service workers while this rate is around 50% in
the population. Similarly, the mean wage in FEZs is around 1,250 e while elsewhere
it is close to 1,800 e. An additional explanation of the wage gap lies in the higher
share of part time job in the FEZs 17% instead of 15% in the population. By design,
the FEZs display strong contrasts with the rest of the metropolitan areas in terms of
unemployment. Thus, the unemployment rate is approximately 27% in the FEZs to be
compared to 15% in the sample of individuals.13 The residential mobility rate is higher
in FEZs(21%) than in the rest of the space (18)%. The next section will be devoted to the
comprehension of this phenomenon.
13The high rate of unemployment can be explained by the sample selection procedure. That is, I got rid
of all the individuals working in the public sector increasing the weight of unemployed in the population.
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Table 2.3: Sample Statistics
Full Urban Areas
Sample Non Zus ZUS ZFU
Age 15 - 24 12.6 11.8 17.3 18.3
25 - 39 39.6 39.7 39.1 38.4
40 - 49 26.1 26.3 24.8 25.6
50 - 59 20.1 20.5 17.4 16.4
60 - 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.3
Male 52.6 52.5 53.4 54.9
Married/cohab 64.5 65.7 57.5 64.5
Citizenship Native 85.3 87.1 74.9 75.9
Immigrant 14.7 12.9 25.1 26.4
Education No diploma 28.5 25.3 47.0 48.4
High school 40.1 40.4 38.2 39.5
Associates 13.9 15.1 7.3 7.0
University 17.5 19.2 7.5 5.1
Occupation Unskilled manual workers 23.8 21.5 37.3 41.4
Sales and service workers 28.7 27.6 35.1 34.3
Middle management 24.3 26.0 14.4 12.6
Senior executive 20.1 22.4 6.5 4.9
No precise occupation 3.1 2.5 6.7 6.8
Labor Market position Unemployed 15.2 13.1 27.5 27.1
Part-time job 15.0 14.8 16.1 17.3
Mobility rate 18.0 17.8 19.2 21.2
Individual net income 1,777 1,846 1,293 1,260
Sample size 13,231 11,305 1,926 907
The characteristics are evaluated at the first interview. The net income is computed on the subset of
employed individuals.
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Table 2.4: Transitions of individuals initially employed
Characteristics of Spells
Type of Number Spell Initial Final
history of transitions Duration Wage Wage
Full sample 11,220 126.4 1,777 1,940
Mobile individuals 1,835 111.7 1,624 -
Without an unemployment spell 7,408 139.8 1,875 1,914
With at least one transition 1,977 82.8 1,556 1,827
A job to job transition 1,249 5.2 1,782 1,893
With an unemployment spell 842 5.7 1,163 1,218
Wages are in Euros and spell durations in months
Table 2.5: Transitions of individuals initially unemployed
Characteristics of Spells
Type of Number Spell Accepted
history of transitions Duration Wage
Full sample 2,009 14.5 1,139
Mobile individuals 552 15.6 -
Without an employment spell 679 29.7 -
Transition to employment 778 6.5 1,139
Wages are in Euros and spell durations in months
After having described the individual characteristics evaluated at the first interview,
I focus now on the transitions. I make a difference according to the job status at the initial
interview. In the set of employed individuals, I can see that 17% of the sample made
at least one transition, while approximately 38% of the unemployed made a transition
to employment. The migration rate of employed individuals is around 16.3% to be
compared to 27.5% for the unemployed individuals. This suggests that some migrations
may be related to a job market transition.
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2.3.1.2 Individual mobility after the policy
In this section, I investigate individual mobility over periods corresponding to before
and after the policy introduction. I focus on the inflow and outflow from the policy
areas.14
I compare the flow of individuals who are leaving a FEZ to the flow of individuals
who are arriving in a FEZ. As expected, individuals who are leaving the FEZs are much
older than the ones who are coming. This phenomenon, not new, is true over the full
period and is related to the housing demand over the life-cycle, and the low rents in the
FEZs. In terms of the marital status, between 1990 and 1999, a majority of individuals
leaving in a FEZ were living in partnership (57%) to be compared to the 46% on the
sample of individuals arriving in a FEZ. In comparison with the period 1999 to 2009,
there is a smaller proportion of married individuals who are leaving the FEZs.
In terms of social demographic characteristics, the gap between FEZs and the rest
of the space is widening over time. That is, from 1990 to 1999, there is at least 89.5%
of incoming individuals who are native. Over the next decade, there is only 77.4% of
incoming who are native. As a consequence, the share of natives decreases in the FEZs
has decreased over time. The same holds for the education level, with a majority of
low educated arriving. Another area where the discrepancy between FEZs and the
rest of the space keeps deepening is in unemployment rate. Among the individuals
who are coming into a FEZ the unemployment rate is around 24% to be compared to
an unemployment rate around 14% for the outgoing individuals. This raises a serious
question about how to measure the effectiveness of the policy.
Finally, there are few individuals who move to a FEZ in order to achieve homeown-
ership: 18% in 1999 and 20% in 2009. On the other hand, a sizeable share of individuals
who leave a FEZ achieve homeownership out of a FEZ (40%). The conjonction of these
two events maintain a high share of renting in the FEZs, more specifically public renting.
14Several others tables that describe more precisely the mobility patterns are provided in the appendix.
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Table 2.6: Transitions in the housing market
Individual Type of transitions from 1990 to 1999
Characteristics ZUS ZFU Inflow Inflow Outflow Outflow
in 1999 → ZFU → ZUS ZUS ZFU ZUS ZFU
Age 10 - 24 14.4 15.6 15.1 15.1 10.2 10.8
25 - 29 11.3 18.6 16.5 15.9 14.6 17.3
30 - 39 23.1 31.2 26.3 27.3 35.5 35.6
40 - 49 20.8 16.4 18.2 18.4 20.1 18.8
50 - 59 14.8 10.1 12.2 12.1 10.1 9.2
60 - 99 15.6 8.1 11.7 11.3 9.4 8.2
Male 44.3 42.9 44.9 44.1 46.4 45.8
Married/cohab 43.6 54.0 46.1 47.8 56.7 57.0
Citizenship Native 84.2 82.3 89.5 86.7 91.9 93.0
Immigrant 15.8 17.7 10.5 13.3 8.1 7.0
Education No diploma 49.2 49.9 42.0 34.9 32.3 31.7
Vocational 32.5 33.5 33.1 32.6 36.7 37.7
High school 10.4 8.1 12.4 14.0 13.3 13.6
Associates 4.9 5.1 6.7 9.3 9.7 9.7
University 3.0 3.4 5.8 9.2 8.0 7.3
Job Status Unemployed 27.2 31.1 24.8 23.4 15.4 16.9
Tenure Homeownership 20.6 13.3 18.2 18.4 40.0 39.4
Renting 73.6 79.1 74.1 73.9 52.4 52.4
Individual Type of transitions from 1999 to 2009
Characteristics ZUS ZFU Inflow Inflow Outflow Outflow
in 2009 → ZFU → ZUS ZUS ZFU ZUS ZFU
Age 20 - 24 11.6 13.9 12.9 13.6 9.1 9.1
25 - 29 17.7 15.2 15.9 16.5 10.7 10.7
30 - 39 28.1 26.1 27.0 27.2 31.6 30.8
40 - 49 19.5 17.2 18.4 15.9 23.3 23.4
50 - 59 14.6 12.3 12.4 12.8 11.6 11.1
60 - 99 8.5 15.3 13.4 14.1 13.7 14.9
Male 44.5 47.1 45.9 44.7 47.5 47.1
Married/cohab 48.8 49.7 50.4 48.9 34.9 37.2
Citizenship Native 68.9 67.6 77.4 74.9 83.9 81.6
Immigrant 31.1 32.4 22.6 25.1 16.1 18.4
Education No diploma 42.1 41.0 30.4 33.4 26.1 27.2
Vocational 32.9 34.6 31.3 32.9 36.2 36.7
High school 14.0 13.4 17.3 16.1 16.6 16.6
Associates 4.9 6.9 10.9 10.2 12.0 11.8
University 6.1 4.1 10.1 7.6 9.1 7.6
Job Status Unemployed 27.4 26.4 23.2 20.6 14.0 14.6
Tenure Homeownership 19.5 14.0 20.0 19.8 41.4 41.3
Renting 73.2 73.2 71.8 72.3 51.0 50.8
The individual characteristics are evaluated at last period.
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Table 2.7: Transitions in the labor and housing markets
Type of transitions from 1990 to 1999
Mobile Not Inflow Outflow Inflow Outflow General
- mobile ZUS ZUS ZFU ZFU Population
Exit from unem-
ployment (%)
81.4 95.4 37.5 0 66.7 100 86.3
Entry into unem-
ployment (%)
7.6 5.7 14.7 15.3 9.1 8.6 6.9
Type of transitions from 1999 to 2009
Mobile Not Inflow Outflow Inflow Outflow General
- mobile ZUS ZUS ZFU ZFU Population
Exit from unem-
ployment (%)
77.0 70.5 62.8 62.4 72.6 70.5 74.4
Entry into unem-
ployment (%)
5.6 4.0 11.0 14.2 6.9 6.4 4.7
Finally, I investigate whether or not a migration is followed by a transition in the
labor market. The table 2.7 computes the share of individuals who made a transition
into employment and unemployment. Compared to the general population of mobile
individuals, the individuals who are arriving in a FEZ, exit less unemployment and
entry more into it.
2.3.1.3 Firm level
I consider another assessment of the policy effectiveness using the mobility of firms.
From 1995 to 2007, a total of 4.36 millions firms has been created in France, with a share
of 1.2% in the areas subject to the policy. 15 About 1.9 millions firms made a mobility
with 1.7% of them moving to a FEZ. As shown in table 2.8, firms implantation is very
sensitive to the size and the sector. On the one hand, the lowest implantation rates (0.2
% and 0.3 % occur for the sectors of public services and transport. On the other hand,
the highest implantation rate (2.5% and 1.5%) construction and support to firms. While,
security issues may explain the lack of implantation into public services, the low rate of
implantation of transport sector firms could be explained by the inner location of the
15I define firm creation as including a taking-over.
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FEZs. The high rate of implantation of firms in the construction sector is likely to be
explained by cuts in the social security contribution which are particularly high in the
construction because of the frequency of accidents. The high rate of firms in support
to firms may be explained by the nature of the task which most of the time does not
require a physical presence in the office. When I consider the survival of new firms, only
2.5 millions of them still exist in 2008. This yields a survival rate of 57%. There is no
significant difference between FEZs and the rest of space.
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Table 2.8: Patterns of firms location from 1995 to 2007
Type Locations
of Non ZFUs ZFUs
creation Number of employees
Creation
Sector Missing 0 1-49 50 and
+
Missing 0 1-49 50 and
+
Missing - 5,737 2,191 34 - 92 24 -
Real estate 7,281 128,773 25,210 37 62 747 172 2
Trade 52,483 861,738 360,784 4,188 804 11,373 3,501 24
Construction 18,011 379,176 155,377 1,278 551 7,718 6,033 11
Energy 4,460 7,325 1,295 214 23 48 12 2
Industry 12,089 196,695 122,217 4,453 124 1,450 1,188 21
Sces to
Firms
50,234 598,120 149,514 3,453 599 7,725 2,766 25
Services 26,889 494,255 234,606 665 171 2,432 1,379 3
Transport 4,756 86,351 38,799 1,138 108 1,915 747 3
Total 172,203 2,758,170 1,089,993 15,882 2,442 33,500 15,822 91
All sectors 4,039,827 51,855
Mobility
Missing - 1,512 976 26 - 41 25 -
Real estate 3,508 35,070 14,758 74 24 208 104 -
Trade 13,169 126,303 106,631 1,111 213 1,661 1,598 5
Construction 9,245 81,414 93,627 814 233 1,348 3,376 12
Energy 101 922 422 85 1 4 6 2
Industry 4,914 42,422 52,775 1,504 80 379 893 13
Sces to
Firms
20,448 188,414 127,676 3,137 405 2,696 3,333 36
Services 5,268 56,804 20,323 208 38 260 173 3
Transport 3,036 29,913 22,576 608 59 472 629 2
Total 59,689 562,774 439,764 7,567 1,053 7,069 10,137 73
All sectors 1,069,794 18,332
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2.4 Estimation and Calibration
In this section, I estimate the model using the data described. In the first subsection,
I present the estimation procedure. In the second, I present the strategy of policy
evaluation that consists of simulating the job offer rate before the policy introduction.
Finally, I present the calibration of the parameters not identifiable.
For this estimation exercise, I restrict my attention to the cities with at least a sample
size of 40 individuals. I assume 3 types of skill levels in the sample.
2.4.1 Structural estimation
Because of the extremely limited sample size in several neighborhoods, and the number
of parameters to be estimated, I develop a Bayesian estimation method that tends to
have better finite sample properties. Another advantage of the Bayesian approach is
that the computation time is 5 times lower.
Estimate the type of workers
The type of workers is estimated using an index function specified as:
Prk =
log(τ0k + τ1kZ1 + τ2kZ2)
1+ ∑K log(τ0k + τ1kZ1 + τ2kZ2)
(2.14)
Where Z1 is the education level, and Z2 the gender. I set the number of types k to 3.
At iteration s, assume the set of structural parameters ηs = {λsu,λse, δ} are set. The
mobility rates γs are set such that they are consistent with the general population, and
µ
(s)
i are also obtained. Then, the estimation procedures are as follows.
Earning and wage offer distribution
Individual wage data allows to evaluate the earning distributions for each location,
gA(w), gZ(w) and gC(w). The Kernel estimator for the density of earnings is :
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gˆ(w) =
1
nh
n
∑
i
K
(
w− wi
h
)
(2.15)
where n is the number of observations, and h is the bandwidth.
After testing several functional forms, I conclude that its choice has not much effect
on the estimation. Therefore, I use a gaussian kernel. Finally, I need to account for the
bias induced by the truncation in the earnings distribution, I follow the literature and
use the specific kernel estimator:
gˆ(w) =
1
nh
n
∑
i
[
φ
(w− wi
h
)][
Φ
(w− w
h
)]
(2.16)
The cumulative distribution GA(w), GZ(w) and GC(w) can be obtained by numerical
integration. Then, equations (2.9) and (2.10) define a relationship between the wage
offer distribution, and the earnings. Hence, I can obtain both FA(w) and FZ(w). Finally,
taking the derivatives yields an expression for f A(w) and f Z(w).
Structural parameters estimation
With the wage offer distributions, I am now in position of estimating the labor market
primitives. In the first step, I estimate the location unobserved heterogeneity parameter.
In the second, the primitives of the model are recovered.
Location specific parameter estimation Given the calibration of the mobility cost, and
the initial parameters, estimate ξ(s+1) by minimizing the distance between the mobility
rate as predicted by the individual location choice model and the mobility rate observed
in the FPDS (pmd)
ξ
(s+1)
i | pm(ξs+1i )− pmd ≃ 0
Labor market structural parameters, Metropolis-Hasting Draw the structural param-
eter η(s+1) by using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. That is, draw the candidate
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structural parameters η∗ from the proposal density πη(η∗|η(s)). Then, derive the accep-
tance probability
Pa = min
{
L(η∗)πη(η(s)|η∗)
L(η(s))πη(η∗|η(s))
, 1
}
(2.17)
where L is the likelihood, as defined in appendix.
That is, let η(s+1) = η∗ (i.e., accept) with probability Pa and let η(s+1) = η(s) (i.e.,
reject) with probability 1− Pa.
Firm productivity distribution
The FOC condition of the firms profit maximizing defines a mapping between the wage
level and the productivity. I assume that this relationship can be described by
w = K(q) = K(p+ µ) (2.18)
The next task is to decompose the firm productivity between its specific component
and the location effect while respecting the constraints imposed by the policy.
Data augmentation for the location specific effect, Metropolis-Hasting Draw the
location fixed effect µ(s+1) by using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. That is, draw
the candidate parameters µ∗ from the proposal density µµ(µ∗|µ(s)). Then, derive the
acceptance probability
Pa = min
{
L f (µ∗,w)πµ(µ(s)|µ∗)
L f (µ(s),w)πµ(µ∗|µ(s))
, 1
}
(2.19)
where L f is the likelihood associated to firm mobility as defined in the appendix.
That is, let µ(s+1) = µ∗ (i.e., accept) with probability Pa and let µ(s+1) = µ(s) (i.e.,
reject) with probability 1− Pa.
Firm specific productivity Recover P+ µ taking K−1(w), and obtain P as K−1(w)− µ
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2.4.2 Policy evaluation
I now turn to the policy evaluation part. I assume that the job arrival rate is specified as:
λij = f1(nj) + f2(uj) + f3(ψij) + f4(ξi + µi) (2.20)
Where nj is the share of firms in the submarket located in j, uj is the unemployment
rate in j and ψij is the distance between i and j.16 I do not assume any functional form
for the relationship between the job offer rate and its determinants. However, I assume
additivity to simplify the estimation issues.
2.4.3 Identification
The identification results of the structural search model are well known in the literature
see e.g Flinn and Heckman (1982). It is well known fromMagnac and Thesmar (2002)
that the identification of the discount factor is complicated, so I do not attempt to estimate
it. Because identification of the model parameters hinges on "qualitative" features of
the empirical transitions and wage distributions, it is essential to have precise empirical
estimates. I hope the restrictive data selection helps for that purpose.
2.4.4 Calibration and functional form assumption
As stated before, several parameters can not be identified, therefore I calibrate them. In
order to calibrate the job arrival rate between regions, I use a feature of the Labor Survey.
During the first interview, individuals are asked about their location and job status one
year before. For the set of individuals who made a mobility in the housing market, I
compute the rate at which they find a job.
Table 2.5 summarizes the calibration of job offer rates obtained from the 2002 Labor
Survey. λCA and λCZ are obtained by averaging out the job offer rates in the other
markets. The job-to-job transition rate observed in this dataset is extremely low between
16 Most of the time, there are several neighborhoods that compose both A and Z in this framework. I
consider here the mean distance between the center of A and each of the neighborhood that composed Z.
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Table 2.5: Data based calibrated parameters
Parameters Local labor markets
Beauvais Besancon Bordeaux Calais Le Mans Lyon Marseille Paris Toulon Troyes
γAA 23.3 25.5 51.3 53.2 35.5 55.5 52.7 55.2 69.0 45.1
γAZ 1.6 2.9 2.1 6.0 1.4 1.9 0.01 2.3 1.7 2.6
γAC 75.1 71.6 46.6 40.8 63.0 42.6 47.1 42.5 29.3 52.3
γZZ 26.9 47.9 49.3 59.6 36.4 53.3 71.2 50.2 52.6 34.2
γZA 34.6 16.4 19.7 15.4 22.7 17.1 0.01 25.9 36.9 34.2
γZC 38.5 35.6 31.0 25.0 40.9 29.5 29.7 24.0 10.5 31.6
γCA 2.2 3.9 7.8 0.9 3.9 10.0 6.2 61.6 2.5 1.9
γCZ 0.01 5.6 6.7 2.2 4.5 5.6 5.6 59.6 4.5 5.6
λACu 0.040 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.085 0.048 0.069 0.065 0.047
λZCu 0.007 0.018 0.007 0.009 0.01 0.006 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.006
λCAu 0.07 0.063 0.067 0.07 0.062 0.065 0.060 0.067 0.067 0.069
λCZu 0.008 0.067 0.008 0.0077 0.0076 0.0081 0.007 0.0085 0.008 0.0081
λACe 0.01
λZCe 0.001
λCAe 0.01
λCZe 0.001
locations, and with very few heterogeneity. As a consequence, I set the parameters to be
equal over the set of markets.
I assume here that the job arrival rate depends on the type of individuals.
I also need to impose a functional form for the capital c(p, µ) and the moving cost
cm. I assume
c(p, µ) = Apθµ1−θ
cm = 0.06× c(p, µ)
This calibration is standard in the literature on migration. Finally, I assume that
mc(s, d) = 5 ∗ log(1+ d) ∗ exp(s1/3)
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Where d is the distance between locations, and s is the floor area of the departing
housing unit.
2.5 Results
The estimated parameters are obtained using Bayesian MCMC. I ran 20,000 iterations,
with the first 5,000 dropped for burn-out. Standard deviations are obtained as the
dispersion during convergence.
2.5.1 Structural parameters estimation
In this section, I report the results of the estimation. I ignore for now the estimation
of job-to-job transition rates, and focus on rates out of unemployment. The table 2.6
summarizes the unobserved heterogeneity component. The location specific unobserved
component for firms is estimated by sector. In the table 2.6, I present the sum over
sectors. The results demonstrate that FEZs are still very unattractive both to firms and
individuals. That is, the gap in firm attraction goes from 1 to 6 in Troyes, to 1 to 100
in Lyon. In terms of job destruction rate, there is no significant difference between the
three types of individuals. As a consequence, I report the mean job destruction rate. In
contrast to the former literature, the estimates for job destruction are particularly high.
The reported job destruction rates are over a period of 18 months to be consistent with
the calibration of job offer rates between markets.
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Table 2.6: Estimation results: Unobserved heterogeneity and job destructions
Parameters Local labor markets
Beauvais Besancon Bordeaux Calais Le Mans
µA 0.34 0.27 0.51 0.15 0.32
µZ 0.01 0.005 0.04 0.003 0.02
ξA 0.41 0.50 0.84 0.32 0.45
ξZ 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.09
δ 0.11 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.15
[0.09-0.12] [0.16-0.018] [0.085-0.095] [0.14-0.26] [0.09-0.18]
Lyon Marseille Paris Toulon Troyes
µA 0.67 0.36 0.78 0.31 0.25
µZ 0.007 0.002 0.04 0.03 0.07
ξA 0.57 0.26 0.88 0.31 0.42
ξZ 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.17
δ 0.14 0.13 0.21 0.18 0.09
[0.12-0.16] [0.10-0.16] [0.20-0.22] [0.16-0.21] [0.08-0.10]
In square brackets: the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles of the posterior distribution
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Table 2.7: Estimation results: Job offers
Parameters Local labor markets
by type Beauvais Besancon Bordeaux Calais Le Mans
λAAu 0.151 0.162 0.181 0.158 0.164
[0.145-0.156 ] [0.152-17.1] [0.178-0.184] [0.152-0.164] [0.159-0.169]
λAZu 0.018 0.017 0.042 0.019 0.011
[0.013-0.024] [0.015-0.019] [0.039-0.045] [0.018-0.020] [0.008-0.014]
λZZu 0.008 0.004 0.015 0.007 0.006
[0.006-0.010] [0.001-0.006] [0.010-0.019] [0.003-0.009] [0.005-0.008]
λZAu 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.004
[0.001-0.005] [0.003-0.008] [0.002-0.006] [0.0014-0.0026] [0.003-0.006]
λAAu 0.096 0.103 0.076 0.081 0.091
[0.087-0.104] [0.092-0.101] [0.073-0.079] [0.077-0.087] [0.085-0.095]
λAZu 0.015 0.011 0.029 0.014 0.008
[0.011-0.021] [0.008-0.015] [0.025-0.035] [0.009-0.020] [0.006-0.011]
λZZu 0.005 0.006 0.011 0.004 0.003
[0.003-0.008] [0.003-0.009] [0.009-0.013] [0.003-0.005] [0.001-0.005]
λZAu 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003
[0.001-0.006] [0.001-0.003] [0.001-0.006] [0.0006-0.0017] [0.001-0.005]
λAAu 0.071 0.068 0.089 0.077 0.095
[0.067-0.078] [0.065-0.070] [0.071-0.083] [0.071-0.082] [0.087-0.101]
λAZu 0.007 0.006 0.013 0.011 0.005
[0.006-0.009] [0.003-0.009] [0.009-0.017] [0.006-0.019] [0.003-0.009]
λZZu 0.015 0.012 0.021 0.009 0.008
[0.011-0.021] [0.009-0.015] [0.017-0.027] [0.005-0.015] [0.006-0.011]
λZAu 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.003 0.005
[0.003-0.005] [0.004-0.009] [0.007-0.013] [0.001-0.005] [0.003-0.009]
Lyon Marseille Paris Toulon Troyes
λAAu 0.177 0.161 0.182 0.148 0.155
[0.171-0.184] [0.159-0.163] [0.177-0.189] [0.143-0.0152] [0.151-0.211]
λAZu 0.021 0.012 0.035 0.016 0.023
[0.017-0.025] [0.009-0.015] [0.031-0.039] [0.012-0.020] [0.018-0.027]
λZZu 0.006 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.012
[0.004-0.008] [0.005-0.007] [0.008-0.015] [0.006-0.013] [0.008-0.015]
λZAu 0.008 0.010 0.002 0.005 0.011
[0.005-0.013] [0.006-0.013] [0.001-0.004] [0.003-0.008] [ 0.007-0.015]
λAAu 0.151 0.062 0.093 0.057 0.064
[0.148-0.155] [0.055-0.067] [0.085-0.099] [0.051-0.062] [0.060-0.067 ]
λAZu 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.017 0.021
[0.008-0.012] [0.008-0.011] [0.009-0.016] [0.014-0.020] [0.018-0.024]
λZZu 0.008 0.016 0.009 0.014 0.016
[0.004-0.012 ] [0.005-0.013] [0.005-0.014] [0.010-0.018] [0.013-0.019 ]
λZAu 0.009 0.015 0.007 0.011 0.015
[0.007-0.012 ] [0.004-0.013] [0.005-0.009] [0.008-0.015] [0.012-0.018]
λAAu 0.11 0.057 0.055 0.061 0.049
[0.107-0.114] [0.052-0.61] [0.053-0.058] [0.057-0.066] [0.046-0.052]
λAZu 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.011 0.007
[0.008-0.014] [0.006-0.011] [0.002-0.011] [0.007-0.014] [0.006-0.008]
λZZu 0.020 0.035 0.019 0.014 0.011
[0.018-0.023] [0.03-0.037] [0.013-0.025] [0.010-0.018] [0.008-0.015]
λZAu 0.016 0.027 0.031 0.012 0.016
[0.012-0.019] [0.022-0.031] [0.026-0.037] [0.007-0.015] [0.014-0.018]
In square brackets: the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles of the posterior distribution
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2.5.2 Policy evaluation
In this section, I analyze the effectiveness of the policy based on inference before the
policy. In order to evaluate the overall effect of the policy, I use the average job offer
rate across individual types.17 The job arrival rates are derived using the following
algorithm:
1. Obtain µA and µZ by estimating the location choice model on the years prior to
the policy introduction and under constant wage assumption.
2. Obtain the location specific unobserved ξ, and compute the job arrival rate as
follows.
(a) Use the mobility rate from 1990 to 1995 to fit ξA and ξZ.
(b) Find a new set of job arrival rates (λu, and λe) to fit the mobility rates.
(c) Repeat until convergence
As shown in the table 2.8, the job arrival rate is higher after the policy than before
although, the difference is insignificant. There is some heterogeneity between local labor
markets. This positive effect holds for residents of the location A, however one should
note that this effect is in the best case an indirect effect of the policy via the increase in
ξA. Surprisingly, the model predicts a decrease in the job arrival rate towards workers
in Z. This is mainly driven by the effect of location unobserved ξ on job arrival rate.
More precisely, the model predicts lower ξ prior to the policy introduction. The extent
to which this is a consequence of the policy remains unclear. On the one hand, it is been
argued that the policy may have had a stigma effect or revealed the negative unobserved
component of the treated zones. On the other hand, one can argued that segregation
is a self enforcing mechanism that would have increased even more without the policy.
My model do not include any mechanism for increased segregation over time. Anyhow,
one should note that a substantial share of enterprise zones have benefited from an
urban renewal program. This program have demolished old and large public housing
17We focus for now
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Table 2.8: Estimations and simulations of the effect of the policy
Parameters Local labor markets
Beauvais Besancon Bordeaux Calais Le Mans
λAAu 0.106 0.111 0.1113 0.10933 0.1166
After λAZu 0.013 0.011 0.028 0.0146 0.008
λZZu 0.0093 0.0073 0.0156 0.0066 0.0056
λZAu 0.0036 0.0046 0.0053 0.002 0.004
λAAu 0.104 0.110 0.112 0.108 0.1061
Before λAZu 0.012 0.011 0.029 0.015 0.009
λZZu 0.0093 0.0074 0.0159 0.0067 0.0055
λZAu 0.0037 0.0045 0.0055 0.0022 0.0041
Lyon Marseille Paris Toulon Troyes
λAAu 0.113 0.093 0.11 0.088 0.089
After λAZu 0.014 0.009 0.018 0.014 0.017
λZZu 0.0113 0.0206 0.0120 0.0123 0.013
λZAu 0.011 0.0173 0.0133 0.0093 0.014
λAAu 0.112 0.094 0.11 0.088 0.090
Before λAZu 0.014 0.009 0.017 0.013 0.017
λZZu 0.0115 0.0206 0.0136 0.0124 0.0135
λZAu 0.011 0.0172 0.0129 0.0095 0.0148
projects to build smaller projects. The conditions to benefit from these new housing were
tightened to favor working families.18 If the ultimate goal of the policy was to decrease
the level of spatial inequalities, it fails. In the best scenario, it may have slowdown the
increase in segregation.
2.6 Extensions
Now, I consider some extensions. First, I investigate on the number of firms needed to
close the gap between the FEZs and the rest of the space. That is, maintaining all the
other determinants of the job offer rate except the number of firms and the agglomeration
effects, I consider the increase in the number of firms that would generate an equal offer
rate across locations. To do so, I start with an artificially high number of relocations in
the FEZ, and I estimate a new agglomeration effect. I iterate until reaching the number
18New homeowners have to be occupy their new dwelling for next eight years, while renters could obtain
a dwelling only via the works council excluding de facto unemployed individuals.
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Table 2.9: Number of firms needed to equalize job offer rates
Parameters Local labor markets
Beauvais Besancon Bordeaux Calais Le Mans
Coefficient 17.8 19.2 15.8 22.9 16.5
Lyon Marseille Paris Toulon Troyes
Coefficient 20.9 21.5 20.7 19.5 17.2
of firms and the µ that yield the same job offer rates for individuals in A and Z. In the
next table I report the number by which the number of firms should be multiplied.
As shown in the table 2.9, for the policy to circumvent the differences between
locations in terms of job rate, the number of firms should increase very substantially.
The proportionality parameter is around 20. One should keep in mind that the number
of firms increases by 2 from 1995 to 2008. The cost of such a policy can not be forecast
since it will require to modify several constraints of the policy in order to attract more
firms. Those constraints act as cost control mechanisms because they limit the size and
the productivity of the targeted firms.
I now propose a decomposition of the job arrival rate based on its component and
on the semiparametric model estimated before.
Table 2.10: The decomposition of job offer rates
Components Share
n 7.1
u 8.4
Distance between locations 42.3
Individual unobserved ξ 11.5
Agglomeration effects µ 15.7
The decomposition of job offer rates shows that the variables measuring the tension
in the local labor market account for approximately 15 % of differences in the job offer
rate. The spatial frictions account for more than 40% of the gap between job offer rates.
These results are driven by the difference in magnitude between λAAu and λ
AZ
u .
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2.7 Conclusion
In this essay, I developed and estimated an equilibrium search model to evaluate the
French Enterprise Zones policy. I extend the existing literature by bringing together
search theory and urban economic in a tractable model. Moreover, I incorporate the
features of tax holiday policies. I develop a new comprehensive theory of individual
and firm location choices in a presence of a binding policy. Search frictions as well as
spatial frictions are modelled.
I structurally estimate the model using a multi-stage algorithm with hierarchical
Bayesian, and nonparametric estimation procedure. The estimation results suggest that
the policy was not effective in curbing unemployment. According to the model, the
number of firms in the FEZs should be increased by at least 20 before getting equality
between locations. Moreover, the model exhibits the importance of spatial frictions,
and of unobserved effects. Given the cost of the policy, and the required steps for its
effectiveness, one may consider a shift in the policy. In the short run, a policy that would
subsidized outgoing mobility of unemployed could be introduced. Such a policy would
increase the likelihood of finding a job. While, in the long run, policies that affect the
quality of life and therefore affect the unobserved heterogeneity parameters should be
considered. I believe that this framework represents an advance in the evaluation of
public policy in the presence of frictions, opportunistic firms and agents, and potential
general equilibrium effects. Nonetheless, the paper suffers from limitations. The first
and the most obvious one is related to the absence of search effort in the model. Indeed
both firms and individuals may need to engage into a costly search process. Given the
level of segregation, and the distribution of skilled workers in space, one may wonder
how the potential search cost affect firms’ location choices. A framework similar to
Ferrall (2008) could provide new insights and a natural extension to this work.
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A Unified Framework For The
Analysis of Inequalities
Introduction
A new empirical literature has emerged that examines the determinants of inequalities
over lifetime. ?, Keane and Wolpin (1997), ? and Heer (2001), among others, have
proposed explanations based on differences across individuals (ability, skills, and human
capital) and the role played by generational transmissions. Surprisingly, a powerful
determinant of lifetime inequalities is left apart. Indeed, Benabou (1993) shows the key
role played by heterogeneity between locations in generating inequalities. However,
Benabou’s framework does not include a comprehensive theory of housing demand. As
a consequence, an important determinant of inequalities which operates through the
dynamics of prices across locations is missing. Indeed, there are potential large spillover
effects between the outcomes of individuals in the labor, housing and education markets.
Among these three markets, housing is the crucial determinant of lifetime inequalities by
its importance in the household’s portfolio and the bridge it builds between education
and labor markets.
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This paper tries to fill this gap by proposing a unified framework for the analysis
of inequalities. I develop an overlapping generation model in the spirit of ?, Huggett
(1993) and Aiyagari (1994). The standard life-cycle model is modified to allow for
heterogeneous agents, a realistic housing market and aggregate uncertainty. This general
framework allows to evaluate household behavior in a lumpy housing market with
renting and owning. Moreover, heterogeneity between locations with respect to their
level of social capital is included.1 The level of social capital in a location influences
household labor productivity and the level of human capital of the next generation. The
model allows for endogenous housing prices based on individual expectations. The
price level affects the timing of homeownership and the set of locations in which it
is possible for a given household to buy a dwelling. Furthermore, the expected price
growth plays a significant role in the individual saving decision and location choice.
At a household level, the key mechanism underlying the model is the trade-off
between the level of social capital and housing prices. For a given household, the level of
social capital of its residential location influences labor productivity. Moreover, parents’
transmission to their children operates through a bequest motive, but also through the
impact of local social capital on children’s human capital formation. A large body of
literature studies the relationship between children outcomes and the characteristics of
their childhood neighborhood (see e.g Oreopoulos, 2003). I specify two mechanisms al-
lowing location to affect children outcomes. First, education infrastructure differs across
locations. This assumption captures the fact that educational attainments differ across
locations not only because of the sorting on student ability but also as a matter of differ-
ences in schooling infrastructure. Second, the level of social capital in the neighborhood
affects the human capital acquisition of the next generation. The heterogeneity in school
quality between locations leads to differences in the next generation level of human
capital. As a consequence, households have a higher preference for the neighborhood
1In the literature, social capital is defined broadly as social cohesion, and personal investment into
community. As a consequence, it refers to a notion of cooperation at a community level. I will use this
broad concept to define how the well-being into a community affects the productivity of adults, and the
human capital acquisition of children.
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with the highest level of social capital, but some may be finance constrained due to the
cost of a housing unit. The fixity of housing supply in each neighborhood combined
with the borrowing constraints prevent some households from living in their preferred
area, which leads to segregation and further strengthens inequalities.
Hence, the effects of borrowing constraints are reinforced by their implications not
only for parents but also children. This form of borrowing constraint is more appealing
than in the existing literature since households should be allowed to borrow not only
against their future income but also against the future income of their children.
For empirical purpose, a unique dataset that provides information on individual
characteristics (Census Data), income and wealth (Wealth Surveys), housing prices
(Housing Surveys) and the spatial differences over locations (Censuses) is created for
France. On the methodological front, this paper contributes to the literature by matching
the nonparametric kernel distribution simulated by the model to the data. This more
demanding approach in terms of computation provides a more accurate representation
of the distribution.
This benchmark allows to run several experiments to assess whether or not a volun-
tary policy can decrease the level of inequalities.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing a unified framework that en-
compasses all the transmission channels of inequalities (wealth inheritance, transmission
of ability, role of capital market imperfections, spatial inequalities). The model focuses
on the features of neighborhoods as of the main determinants of both short-run and
long-run inequalities. Using a general framework where the interactions between hous-
ing, labor and education markets are represented, I can bring together several parts
of the literature which are inherently close but were diverging until now. On the one
hand, the literature on segregation provides several pieces of evidence on the impact of
neighborhoods in the generation of cross-section inequalities (see e.g. for racial segrega-
tion Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Bajari and Kahn, 2005 and for income stratification Epple
and Sieg, 1999). On the other hand, an extensive body of literature tries to decompose
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lifetime inequality (Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez, and Rios-Rull, 2003; ? and Piketty, 2000
for an emphasis on social capital).
For years, the literature on intergenerational mobility has been held back because of
the lack of reliable data sources. In the recent period, administrative Scandinavian data
have allowed better measures of intergenerational inequalities. The problem remains
for bigger developed countries. Using standard datasets, the results differ widely.2
The surveys by Solon (1999) and Piketty (2000) provide two interesting overviews with
differentiated emphasis.3 Here, the predictive quality of the model is used to report
empirical evidence about intergenerational mobility.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in the first section, the related literature
is presented. In the second, the model and the computation strategy are presented. In the
third, the data are presented with an emphasis on the spatial and life-cycle dimension of
the variables of interest. In the fourth section, I present the results and their implications.
Finally, several policy experiments are simulated.
3.1 Previous Literature
The existing literature on inequalities focuses on two topics: the decomposition of
lifetime inequalities, and the determinants of wealth concentration.4 In this section, I
focus on the determinants of lifetime inequalities and the macroeconomic literature that
tries to mimic wealth distribution.
First, the sources of lifetime inequalities have been extensively analyzed. Some
findings from
Keane and Wolpin (1997), Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) and ? are summa-
rized. The question is to quantify respectively the share of lifetime inequalities that can
be attributed to differences in initial conditions and to shocks received over lifetime.
2The most used datasets are the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the British Cohort Study, The German
Socio-Economic Panel and the French Wealth Surveys.
3Solon (1999) analyses the intergenerational mobility with an emphasis on insight from the data, Piketty
(2000) investigates the inequalities in the long run and tries to infer about transfers from parents to children.
4The reader interested in dynamics of wealth concentration should take a look at ? for the US, ? for
France, and ? for Switzerland.
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Among all these models, Keane and Wolpin (1997) are the only one to consider struc-
tural estimation. Keane and Wolpin (1997) estimate a realistic model of career choice
for a sample of young men. They find that differences across individuals realized at
age 16 accounts for approximately 90% of the variance in lifetime utility. These results
contrast with the work of Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) who attributes to initial
conditions only half of lifetime inequalities. Finally, in a recent paper, ? study the same
question allowing for three sources of differences across individuals: initial human
capital, learning ability and financial wealth. The results demonstrate that variation in
initial conditions accounts for approximately 61.5% of lifetime earnings. Unfortunately,
these models lack a mechanism explaining the formation of initial conditions.
Second, an important macroeconomic literature tries to reproduce the wealth distribu-
tion using OLG models. Earlier references include Huggett1993 and Aiyagari (1994) on
the role of aggregate uncertainty. Recent literature extends in two directions: allowing
for productivity shocks (Krusell, Smith, and Jr., 1998) and bequest (?). Krusell, Smith,
and Jr. (1998) make a significant contribution to the literature. They extent the basic
dynastic models to allow for aggregate shocks. The motivation builds on the need to
understand how the level of inequalities responds to income shocks. The model fits well
the Gini index of wealth distribution. ? provides new insights using a life cycle model
with intergenerational transmission of genes and altruistic bequests. The model builds
upon Heer (2001) and adopts a richer earnings process. The model fits extremely well
the US wealth distribution.
However, this literature on inequalities puts a lot of effort in mimicking the wealth
distribution without paying attention to the deep process that generates inequalities. To
overcome this, here, the generic model of inequalities is brought with the large and grow-
ing literature that analyzes the aggregate behavior of economies with heterogeneous
agents, incomplete markets, aggregate uncertainty and a realistic housing market. In this
literature, Iacoviello and Pavan (2009) develop a life-cycle model with lumpy housing
prices and heterogeneity in household’s productivity to study the debt over life-cyle. On
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a more empirical side, Li and Yao (2007) construct a life-cycle model of housing tenure
choice to study the impact of housing price changes on household consumption and
welfare. Li, Liu, and Yao (2009) estimate a structural model of housing consumption
to identify the role of different factors in the explanation of the life-cyle properties of
housing. ? analyzes the relationship between the tenure choice of an individual and
the composition of its portfolio. However, the reach of this literature is limited by the
absence of an endogenous price formation mechanism. An alternative modeling strategy
considers housing as an additional competitive sector in dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (see e.g. Davis and Heathcote, 2005 and Fisher, 2007). Prices are derived
from a construction sector. However, this literature does not consider heterogeneous
locations although it is well know in urban economics, that the price of a dwelling de-
pends on its location and the characteristics of the neighborhood it belongs to (Ioannides,
2010). As a consequence, the previous models are not able to generate static differences
in housing prices over locations and heterogeneity in their evolution over time. As will
be shown in the following, heterogeneous locations allow to understand simultaneously
the dynamics of spatial and overall inequalities and how they are related over time.
3.2 Model
The economy analyzed in this paper is a modified version of the standard OLG model
with heterogeneous agents and heterogeneous locations.5 The key features of the model
are as follows: (i) it includes a large number of households who are altruistic toward their
descendants; (ii) agents are heterogeneous with respect to their age, idiosyncratic ability,
human capital and wealth; (iii) households live in different locations; (iv) each location
is ruled by a local government while the economy is ruled by a federal government;
(v) locations are heterogeneous with respect to the level of social capital; (vi) the level
of social capital affects the productivity of adults and the human capital acquisition of
children; (vii) agents make mobility choice in a realistic housing market; (viii) the capital
5In the rest of this paper, I will assume that a household is composed of a representative adult with or
without children. I use the terms "households", "agents" and "individuals" interchangeably.
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market is not perfect; as a consequence, some households may be finance constrained; (ix)
agents face an uninsured idiosyncratic risk of unemployment; (x) individuals inherited
bequest from their parents and transmit wealth to their heirs.6
3.2.1 Household preferences
There is a continuum of measure 1 of agents indexed by i ∈ [0; 1] and time is discrete.
Let’s denote by a the age of an individual. Individuals are born at age a = 20, live at
most T periods, work until T˜. θ denotes the deterministic probability to survive from
age a to a+ 1. Therefore the distribution of agents over age Πa is stationary. At birth,
each agent draws its family size and the timing of the birth.
There is a large number of locations denoted n ∈ N ≡ {1, . . . ,N}. Each neighbor-
hood has an endogenous level of social capital denoted z. The total social capital is
fixed with ΠZ being the unique invariant measure, therefore it is only its allocation over
neighborhoods that changes over time.
Each household has an ability denoted j ∈ J ⊂ [J, J] which is revealed at age 20. The
level of human capital, specific to each household, is denoted w ∈ W ≡ [W,W] which is
acquired from age 20 to 21. The level of human capital of an agent depends on his birth
neighborhood n˜, and his ability j.
Households receive utility from the consumption of two goods, the non-durable
good and the housing services. In addition, households value the human capital and the
bequest of the next generation.
A typical household chooses its housing consumption level h ∈ H in order to
maximize its utility:
u(ca, ha, n) = u(ca, ha) + ςw(j f , in, zn) If a ≤ 55
u(ca, ha) = u(ca, ha) If a > 55
6 A summary of the subsequent notations used is available in appendix.
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Where ς is the parent’s degree of altruism towards her children. w(j f , in, zn) is the
human capital acquisition function which depends on the child’s ability j f , social capital
infrastructure in and the level of social capital zn in neighborhood n. To reconcile the
model with reality, it is assumed that for their children’s human capital acquisition
process, parents value the quality of their neighborhood ten years before and ten years
after the birth of their children.
Such a utility function encompasses the case with no intergenerational transfer when
ς = 0. The age specific instantaneous CRRA utility corrected by family size at age a, Γa,
is
u(can, han) =
((
c
Γa
)1−σ( h
Γa
)σ)1−γ
1− γ (3.1)
Individuals can not borrow except for buying a house. The total savings of an
individual is given by −b, and its total liability is given by b. These savings are invested
into a risk-free asset which pays a gross interest R = 1+ r. All firms can borrow at this
rate.
3.2.2 Labor Market
The specification of the labor market is similar to that in Lucas and Prescott (1974). Hence,
each period, employed individuals draw a layoff probability ϑ, while unemployed
workers draw a hiring probability λ. The wage rate is fixed, as a consequence the only
source of heterogeneity in total wage is the level of productivity.
The household labor productivity given by lajzw can be decomposed between the
contributions of: age la, social capital in his current neighborhood lz, ability lj and human
capital lw.
Let’s assume that the wage per unit of labor supply is ̟, and income is taxed at a
proportional rate ty. Hence, the individual net income is given by
y = e.(1− ty)
(
̟lajzw
)
+ (1− e).d (3.2)
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Where e is the labor market status, which is 1 if employed and 0 else. d is after tax
unemployment benefit.
This simple specification of the labor market introduces aggregate uncertainty and
the related insurance problem.
3.2.3 Housing Market
The housing supply is fixed in each neighborhood:
H(n) = H¯ ∀ n ∈ N
Housing is a dual good: households can either rent (only consume housing services)
or buy a dwelling (invest in housing and consume the housing services). The tenure is
summarized by the dummy ι which is equal to 1 if the household is homeowner and
0 otherwise. Housing as an asset depreciates at rate δh. The real estate agencies (REA)
play the intermediary role in every transaction. The introduction of the REA improves
the fluidity of the housing market, and avoid waiting-list phenomenon in the housing
market. In addition, we assume that only REA can be landlords i.e households can not
own more than one house.
The price of a rental unit in neighborhood n is given by qn. A selling unit in the
neighborhood n is evaluated at price pn. Owner-occupiers and landlords must respec-
tively pay a property tax tp and tpr, while renters pay a residential tax tr. Households
can decide to adjust their housing consumption. There is no adjustment cost for renters
whereas homeowners incur a transaction cost of selling τh which is proportional to the
value of the house.
When a household wants to buy a house, she may be subject to the imperfection of
the capital market. In the literature, financial constraints are introduced as a limitation
in the amount an individual can borrow against his future income. Applications include
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), ? and Iacoviello and Pavan (2009).7 In this framework, a
7A household can not borrow more than its expected earnings. This is ensured by the transversality
condition.
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downpayment constraint is assumed
−b ≥ κpn
This form of borrowing constraint is consistent with the French institutions which
relies heavily on individual capacity to refund.
REA are risk-neutral and borrow at the interest rate r to buy any available dwelling.
An immediate consequence of the risk neutrality of REA is that rental units consist of
apartments not sold. Hence, in the most appreciated location, there is a mechanic effect
that drives up the share of homeowners in the most appreciated neighborhood.
The real estate industry is competitive and pays taxes on its net income and cap-
ital gains. The perfect competition yields a zero profit condition that describes the
relationship between rents and prices:
qn =
(
δh + tpr +
r
1+ r
)
pn − 11+ r E(pnt+1 − pn | n) (3.3)
This relation defines the usage cost of an owner-occupied housing unit.
3.2.4 Production
In this economy, there is a large number of firms located in different neighborhoods.
However, I assume that a representative firm exists, which maximizes its total profit.
The production function is given by :
Yt = F(Kt, Lt) = Kαt−1L
1−α
t (3.4)
where K is the aggregate capital stock and L is the stock of working efficiency
labor units in the entire economy. Capital depreciates at rate δK. Given the aggregate
consumption C, government spending G, the aggregate resource constraint is :
Y = C+ G+ Kt+1 − (1− δK)K (3.5)
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3.2.5 Government Budget Constraint
There are two levels of governance in the model: a federal government at the economy
level and a local government at the neighborhood level. Each government operates
a redistribution. The federal government collects taxes on labor earnings and assets
revenues to pay for unemployment benefits and the rest of the revenue is redistributed
to the neighborhoods proportionally to their population size. The local government
collects proportional taxes on property and renting. This cash flow allows to pay for the
education infrastructure.
The objective is to not give a strategic role to the government, therefore its behavior
is given.
3.2.6 Timing
Let’s describe the timing of the model:
• At the beginning of the period t, a measure (1− θ) of households die
– The heirs pay off any accidental debt and collect any bequest
• A measure θ of agents survive
– The households decide to move or to stay. If a household decides to move, she
has to sell her former housing unit ht and chooses its tenure ιt+1, its housing
and goods consumption ht+1, ct+1 and its wealth level bt+1. If she decides to
stay, she will choose c′ and bt+1
– Kt and Lt are supplied
– Wage, interest income and taxes are paid. Consumption and housing services
are consumed
– The neighborhood-specific job arrival rates, and job destruction rates are
revealed.
• Some agents are born
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– Observe the birth neighborhood and the corresponding level of social capital
z, and human capital infrastructure i f
– Observe its ability
– Acquire human capital
– Become adults the next period, and leave their parents’ home.
• Some agents retire
– The retired agents do not value anymore the level of social capital of their
location. A housing adjustment may happen.
The model does not keep track of children development. It is assumed that parents
value the characteristics of their location 10 years before and ten years after the birth of
children. As a consequence, when young adult leave their parents home at age 21, the
parents continue to value the characteristics of the neighborhood the 9 following years.8
3.2.7 Locational Equilibrium
In a locational equilibrium, households sort across neighborhoods along the dimensions
on which they differ. In contrast to the literature on equilibrium local jurisdictions (Epple
and Platt, 1998; Epple, Filimon, and Romer, 1993), the fixity of housing supply in each
neighborhood induces a higher degree of stratification.
Definition: Consider a set of neighborhoods, n = 1, . . . ,N. An allocation of house-
holds across neighborhoods is an equilibrium only if:
1. The static housing choices are optimal i.e each household maximizes its housing
consumption subject to the budget constraint.
2. The local housing markets clear.
8It is assumed that agents are born at age 20 and become adult after one year. This assumption simplifies
the dimension of the state variables and avoids to keep track of households over a long period of time.
However, this simplification is not realistic. As a consequence, It is assumed that parents value the
characteristics of the location 10 years before the birth of the children and 10 after this birth.
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3.2.8 The Household Problem
At period t, the set of individual state variables is: wt the household human capital, jt its
ability, zt the level of social capital of the neighborhood it belongs to, bt−1 the nonhousing
wealth or debt, ht−1 the housing stock owned former period, ιt−1 for tenure, et for the
labor market status and at for age. Let’s denote by st ≡ (at,wt, jt, et, zt−1, bt−1, ht−1, ιt−1).
Given initial condition, the household problem is to make a set of two choices: a
mobility decision (move or stay), a tenure choice (rent or own).
Th dynamic problem of an agent with state variables st is:
V(s, β) = max{Vs(st, β), sup
z
{Vmr(st, β)}, sup
z
{Vmh(st, β)}}
under the constraint of the total resources of household bt. Vs, Vmr and Vmh are
respectively the value function if an agent stays, rents after a mobility and owns after a
mobility.
3.2.8.1 The value of staying
An individual who decides to stay in its current housing unit can not adjust its consump-
tion of housing. As a consequence, the choice set is reduced to consumption and saving.
The value of staying is the solution to the following problem:
Vst(st, β) = sup
ct,bt
u(c, h, a) + θaβE[V(st+1, β)]
s.t. yt + bt − [rbt−1(1+ tibt−1≥0]) ≥ ct +
[
ι
[
pnt(tp)
]
+ (1− ι)[qn(1+ tr)]]ht
ct ≥ 0; ht ≥ 0
Where ibt−1 ≥ 0 is a dummy indicating that the household had savings.
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When an individual decides to move, she has to choose the location that maximizes
its utility under its resource constraint. The index of the current location is nt, while the
next location is given by nt+1.
3.2.8.2 The value of moving and renting
The value of moving and renting is the solution to the following problem:
Vmr(st, β) = sup
ct,ht,bt,zt
u(ct, ht, a) + θaβE[V(st+1, β)]
s.t. yt + bt − [rbt−1(1+ tibt−1≥0]) + ιt−1
[
(1− τh)(1− δH)pnt−1ht−1
] ≥ ct + [qn(1+ trn)]ht
ct ≥ 0; ht ≥ 0
3.2.8.3 The value of moving and owning
Finally, the value of moving and owning is the solution to the following problem:
Vmr(st, β) = sup
ct,ht,bt,zt
u(ct, ht, a) + θaβE[V(st+1, β)]
s.t. yt + bt − [rbt−1(1+ tibt−1≥0]) + ιt−1
[
(1− τh)(1− δH)pnt−1ht−1
] ≥ ct + ιt[pnt(1+ tpnt )]ht
b ≥ (1− κ)pntht
ct ≥ 0; ht ≥ 0
3.2.9 Bequest Motives
Until now, an explicit bequest motive was not allowed. That is, any accidental bequest
was collected by the local government. In this section, a motive for bequest is introduced.
The main complication comes from the fact that it adds another term to the value
function. Let’s illustrate this using the value function of staying.
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Vs(st, β) = sup
ct,bt
u(ct, ht, a) + θaβE[V(st+1)] + (1− θa)ςψ(bt+1 + ι(pnt+1 · ht) (3.6)
With all these concepts at hand, it is now possible to define an equilibrium.
3.2.10 Competitive Recursive Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of value functions {V(st, β)}, policy func-
tions for the mobility decision {S∗(st, β), the saving decision B∗(st, β)}, the tenure
choice ι∗(st, β), the level of social capital Z∗(st, β), the consumption C∗(st, β), and the
wage rate ̟∗(st, β) for each age and aggregate variables Kt, Lt,Hht ,Gt , level of taxes
{ty}, {ti}, {tp}, {tr}, prices pnt, qnt for each period t, and the joint distribution of all
states Φ such that:
1. The locational equilibrium holds with respect to its former definition.
2. Given the housing prices in each neighborhood (qnt , pnt), the wage rate ̟t and
the laws of motion (πK, πL): K∗ and L∗ are determined competitively at any t
r∗ + δk = FK(K∗, L∗) (3.7)
̟∗ = FL(K∗, L∗) (3.8)
3. The unemployment rate is stationary, and the labor supply equals:
L∗ =
∫
lajzw(z, β)dΦt(a, e, n, j, bt−1, ht−1, zt−1) (3.9)
4. The asset market clears at any t
K∗ =
∫
b∗ +
(
[1− ι∗]q∗n∗ −
[
1− tp − τh − δh
]
p∗n∗
)
h∗dΦt(a, e, n, j, bt−1, ht−1, zt−1)
(3.10)
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5. The distribution of bequest is stationary.
6. The rental price is given by the no-arbitrage condition in the real estate sector
q∗n∗ =
(
δh + tp +
r∗
1+ r∗
)
− 1
1+ r∗
E(p∗nt − p∗nt−1 | n) (3.11)
7. The housing market clears in every neighborhood
H¯ = H(n) =
∫
h∗ndΦt(a, e, n, j, bt−1, ht−1, zt−1) (3.12)
8. The federal and local governments budgets constraint hold
G∗F = ty̟
∗L∗ +
∫ (
tir
∗b∗ − d
)
dΦt(a, e, n, j, bt−1, ht−1, zt−1) (3.13)
G∗L =
1
N
G∗F +
∫ (
ιh∗p∗n∗ tp + (1− ι)h∗q∗n∗ tr
)
dΦt(a, e, n, j, bt−1, ht−1, zt−1) (3.14)
9. The distribution of the state variables Φt(a, e, n, j, bt−1, ht−1, zt−1) is stationary.
3.2.11 Solution Method
The model has no analytical solution, thus I follow the literature and solve it numerically
like Heer (2001). However, there are some issues linked to the housing dimension and
differences across neighborhoods. The most important one is the level of prices which is
endogenous. Since there is no aggregate production shocks, and we focus on the steady
state of the model, the major computation issue of the model comes from the housing
prices. The solution algorithm tries to derive for each neighborhood a sequence of prices
that equalizes demand and supply every period. The general solution algorithm for the
model consists of the following steps:
Step 1: Make initial guesses of steady state values of the aggregate labor supply L and
the aggregate capital K.
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Step 2: Guess an initial level of housing prices in every neighborhood and the corre-
sponding rental price
Step 3: Given housing prices, labor productivity, and interest rate, compute the opti-
mal decision functions by tenure, employment status, income levels, portfolio
composition in each neighborhood
Step 4: Iterate backward in time t = Tc−1, . . . , 1 and recover the sequence of housing
prices and policy functions.
Step 5: Compute the optimal path for human capital investment, consumption, saving,
employment, residential choices for the new-born generation.
Step 6: Compute the steady-state distribution of assets and bequests in each cohort-
neighborhood
Step 7: Compute the aggregate capital stock K and Labor supply L
Step 8: Update K and L and return to step 3 until convergence
Before the first step, an optimal time horizon Tc, which is 300 years.
In step 3 and 4, a finite-time dynamic program is solved by iterating the policy
functions of generation t backward starting in the last period. The policy functions are
computed from the Euler equation for each type of agents over a discrete grid. I can
determine the optimal decision for period t given period t+ 1 optimal controls in grid
points. I use a cubic spline interpolation technique in order to get optimal decisions.
At step 6, the distributions of assets and bequests are recovered using the preceding
values. I start the computation of the model based on data from the 1990 census, and
iterate until reaching a steady state. I made an assessment of the model based on census
data available in 1999, then I present the result derived from equilibrium.9
9The solution of the model is very demanding in terms of computation. It takes 15 days CPU time on a
Unix Workstation.
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3.3 Data
The agents and the locations are heterogeneous along a large number of dimensions. I
use the 1990 and 1999 French population censuses to characterize them. The population
census contains extensive information about employment, household composition,
education, geographical location for one fourth of the population. The sample size
allows to compute the precise individual characteristics at the suitable geographical
level and provides a full picture of the housing market. In the empirical analysis, a
neighborhood is an IRIS, the French equivalent to the US census blocks.
Using two samples allows to construct a mobility matrix between locations over a
period of 10 years. A notable limitation of the French census is the absence of financial
information. That is, wealth, income and housing prices are missing. The following
strategy is used. First, the distribution of income (moments) over space can be obtained
from an administrative source, Revenus Fiscaux des Menages. This distribution can be
computed at the finest geographical level (IRIS). Then, the first two moments (mean and
standard deviation) can be used to draw an income for each household depending on
its neighborhood.
The information about wealth comes from two wealth surveys: Actifs 92 and Patri-
moine 2004.10 However, the limited sample size per neighborhood does not allow to
characterize the full distribution of assets. To overcome this, I assume that the distribu-
tion of wealth across and within a neighborhood is three times as volatile as the income
distribution.
Finally, housing prices data comes from the 1992, 1996 and 2002 French Housing
surveys. A mean price by square meter is computed for each transaction. However, the
number of neighborhoods present in the two samples is limited. In the final sample,
only 1,006 neighborhoods with all the required variables are considered. These neigh-
borhoods are located in the 30 biggest French metropolitan areas. In order to reduce the
computational burden, only a fifth of the 1999 census data is considered. This yields a
10Since 1986, the French Statistical Office (INSEE) have carried out a survey on Wealth every six years. It
was called Actifs Financiers until 1992, before becoming Enquete Patrimoine in 1998.
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total sample size of 500,588 individuals with the neighborhood population ranging from
290 to 1,106.
3.3.1 Descriptive Evidence
I start by describing the life-cycle dimension of the basic variables. Let’s start by family
size over the life-cycle using the 1999 census.
Figure 3.1: Family size over the life cycle
As expected, the family size follows an inverse U shape that is consistent with the
patterns of family composition over the life-cycle. The family size reaches its maximum
size around 40 years, and then decreases.
It is now insightful to look at the similarities between family size and homeownership.
The Figure 3.2 plots the rate of homeownership as a function of age.
The share of homeowners in the population increased from 53.8% in 1992 to 56.0% in
2002. This rise is driven by the persistence of a high homeownership rate for individuals
older than 60. However, Figure 3.2 missed the decrease in the flow of new homeowners
that started after 1996.
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Figure 3.2: Homeownership over the life-cycle (Housing Surveys)
Regarding the labor market, Figure 3.3 plots the unemployment rate over the life-
cycle in 1992 and 2002. I record an unemployment rate of 10.5 % in 1993, and 8 % in
2002. The differences between the two distributions reflect this discrepancy.
The distribution of housing wealth over the life-cycle is now analyzed. There is a
large discrepancy between the housing stock detained by French households over the
period from 1992 to 2004. The most plausible explanation is related to the increase in the
general level of prices. 11
11Because of the small sample size, the data shows several inconsistent spikes.
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Figure 3.3: Unemployment over the life-cycle (Labor Surveys)
Some basic facts about intergenerational transfers are documented based on the
wealth surveys 1992 and 2004. There is a large discrepancy between the transmission
behavior in 1992 and 2004. That is, only 5% of the households perceived a donation in
1992, while the rate is close to 20% in 2004. The same holds for inheritance, only 18% of
households declared an inheritance in 1992, while the rate is close to 40% in 2004. These
discrepancies may reflect changes in the thresholds for the taxation of inheritance. In
terms of amount, it is complicated to provide a comparison over time since the amount
are presented by ranges, and the categories are not constant over time. To overcome this,
the more homogeneous 1998 and 2004 Wealth surveys are used to provide some facts
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Figure 3.4: Housing wealth over the life cycle (Wealth Surveys)
about generational transfers. Table 3.1 shows the evolution of the share of bequest in
individual wealth. For more than half of the population, 60.3% in 1998 and 58.3 % in
2004, there has been no inheritance yet. Two important facts need to be pointed out in
terms of dynamics. First, the share of individuals who did not benefit from inheritance
or did not inherit a negligible amount decreases over time while the share of individuals
who benefit from a substantial share of their total wealth increases.
Data are completed with the findings of ? who reports around 10% of national wealth
transferred across generations. These transmissions are not uniformly distributed. In
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Table 3.1: Share of inheritance between 1998 and 2004
Share 1998 2004
No inheritance 60.3 58.3
Null 8.6 7.7
Less than 25 % 18.2 18.5
From 25 to 50% 6.7 7.4
More than 50% 5.5 6.8
Notes: Sources: Patrimoine 1998, 2004. Number of observations: 10,207 in 1998
9,239 in 2004
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics over neighborhoods (Census 1999 and 2002 Housing Survey)
Minimum Mean Sd Maximum
Share of homeowners 1.2 49.7 19.6 95.2
Share of unemployed 4.2 12.1 5.7 50.2
Share of individuals with no degree 2.3 13.1 6.8 43.2
Share of individuals with college education 1.1 9.9 2.8 17.2
Price by square meter in 2002 in e 249.5 1,542 831 9,147
Notes: Sources: Census 1999, Housing Survey. The analysis uses the observations from the 30 biggest
metropolitan areas.
1994, the top 10% generational transmissions represented 55% of the total transfers
across generations.
After having described the life-cycle dimension, the distribution of some basic
characteristics over space can be analyzed.
Both homeownership and unemployment rates are very spread across locations.
Table ?? reports the distributions. More surprisingly, given the existence of mandatory
education in France, the level of individuals with no degree per neighborhood is also
very spread moving 2.3% to 43.2% revealing a high level of sorting. Finally, the level of
housing prices ranges from 249.5 e in the municipality of Denain in the North of France
to 9,147 e in the 7th district of Paris.
3.4 Results
In the model, the households choose consumption, saving and make residential choices.
I consider for now the model when individuals do not have a bequest motive i.e any
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bequest is collected by the local government. As displayed in Figure 3.5, the model
fits until age 65, and does not perform well in predicting the homeownership rate after
retirement. Indeed, agents over consume both goods and housing services without
holding any housing asset. This is due to the fact that the prospective increase in price
combined with the lower usage cost of homeownership does not compensate for the
level of transaction and maintenance costs.
Figure 3.5: Homeownership over the life cycle (Results)
Instead of recalibrating the parameters, I move directly to the model where agents
have a bequest motive which provides much more interesting results.
3.4.1 Homeownership Over The Life-cycle
The model fits extremely well the homeownership rate over the life-cycle. In 2002,
the model predicts an homeownership rate of 54.6% to be compared to 54.2% in the
data. According to the analysis, the equilibrium homeownership rate is approximately
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50.2% which is substantially lower than the last available homeownership rate, 57.8% in
2009. Moreover, the homeownership rate has been increasing since the early 2000. As a
consequence, the housing market may be running on a disequilibrium path.12 The effect
of the predicted slowdown in the homeownership rate is not uniform across life-cycle.
Indeed, the equilibrium homeownership rate is almost always lower than in the data
except for the range of ages higher than 70. The presence of bequest plays a decisive role
in generating this result as explained in the preceding section.
Figure 3.6: Homeownership over the life cycle (Results)
12Our model does not include the favorable institutional environment set up to promote homeownership
after 1996. A free interest rate loan was set up in 1996 for low-income household.
105
Essay 3. A Unified Framework For The Analysis of Inequalities
3.4.2 Prices and Social Capital over Locations
Prices and the level of social capital in equilibrium are now analyzed. Figure 3.7 displays
the equilibrium prices (in 1/K e) and level of social capital against their values in the
data. In equilibrium, both the level of prices and social capital are much more spread
to the right than in the data. This indicates a higher dispersion, and a widening of
inequalities across neighborhoods.
Figure 3.7: Nonparametric density of the distributions of prices and social capital
Table 3.3 reports the moments of the former distributions. Equilibrium and initial
prices display strong distributional differences. The first quarter and the median of the
equilibrium prices are respectively 0.08 and 0.12 whereas these quantiles are equal to
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0.10 and 0.13 in the data. The large dispersion of the equilibrium prices yields a standard
deviation of 0.21 to be compared to 0.08 in the data.
Table 3.3: Prices and social capital distributions
Moments and Quantiles
Min 1st Qu. Median Mean Std dev. 3rdQu. Max
Price (Data) 0.0249 0.1001 0.1343 0.1542 0.0831 0.1829 0.9147
Prices (Equilibrium) 0.2011 0.0828 0.1205 0.2015 0.2119 0.1832 1.090
Social capital (Data) 0.2397 0.4381 0.4909 0.4932 0.0826 0.5473 0.7712
Social capital (Equilibrium) 0.0504 0.3250 0.4008 0.4464 0.1787 0.5088 0.9346
The same shift happens with the level of social capital. As a consequence, the
equilibrium relation between prices and the level of social capital exhibits stronger
correlation than in the initial period. That is, the initial correlation that the model
matched was around 0.17 whereas in equilibrium, correlation is approximately 0.76.
To sum up, there is a higher level of price discrimination in equilibrium. The related
mechanism is driven by the competition for the best neighborhoods which drives up the
level of prices. This leads to the concentration of characteristics positively correlated to
social capital in the best locations. This self-enforcingmechanism is themain determinant
of these results. This result in terms of sorting reflects the equilibrium of the model, and
are derived from the initial conditions provided by data.
3.4.3 Unemployment Over The Life-cycle And Between Locations
The outcome of the model in terms of unemployment is shown in Figure 3.8. The
calibration of the job offer rate assumes skill-specific job arrival rate. The model fits
very well the unemployment rate over the life cycle. However, there are some distri-
butional differences between the simulated equilibrium and the data. In equilibrium,
the unemployment rate is much lower for young people (less than 30 years) than in
the data. Conversely, the equilibrium unemployment rate is higher for individuals
between 60 and 65 years old than in the data. This result is driven by the dynamics of
inequalities. As disparities across individuals and locations widen, the job arrival rate for
this class of individuals, which was low in our baseline calibration, does not adjust. As a
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consequence, the unemployment rate increases. Table 3.4 summarizes the differences
between locations. An unforeseen outcome is related to the highly polarized distribution
of unemployment. While in the data, only 5 neighborhoods have an unemployment
rate lower than 5%, in equilibrium, there are 122 such neighborhoods. Likewise, only
3 neighborhoods in the data have an unemployment rate higher than 40% whereas in
equilibrium there are 141 neighborhoods in this case. The increase in the disparities
between neighborhoods is explained by the high segmentation according to the level of
social capital.
Figure 3.8: Unemployment over the life cycle (Results)
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Table 3.4: Unemployment per age and locations
Moments and Quantiles
Min 1st Qu. Median Mean Std dev. 3rdQu. Max
Local Unemployment (Data) 0.0422 0.0891 0.1119 0.1276 0.0575 0.1529 0.4981
Local Unemployment (Model) 0.0119 0.0633 0.0878 0.1595 0.1773 0.1160 0.9204
The former results are confirmed by the nonparametric estimation of the distribution
of unemployment over locations. Two pieces of evidence can be drawn from Figure 3.9.
On one hand, the distribution presents a spike at a very low unemployment rate, around
4%. On the other hand, another peak of a smaller magnitude takes place around 50%.
Figure 3.9: Nonparametric density of unemployment rates over locations
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3.4.4 Wealth and Intergenerational Link
This section is devoted to the intergenerational link. Table 3.5, reports the characteristics
of individuals at the bottom and the top of the wealth distribution. The ultimate goal is
to examine the contribution of differences across generations, individuals and locations
into overall inequalities.
On one hand, the individuals at the bottom of the wealth distribution have hardly
inherited 1% of their current wealth. Basically, these individuals have a tiny level of
wealth, as a consequence, the amount of bequest is negligible. However, there is a great
deal of endogeneity explaining this outcome. Due to the low level of social capital in
their birth location, several individuals do not get a high education. As a consequence,
their prospect in the labor market and in terms of wealth accumulation are slim. On
the other hand, the richest individuals have a high share of bequest in their wealth.
Bequests account for 88% of the wealth of the individuals in the top percentile. These
individuals have a lower level of education and ability than their counterpart belonging
to the 10% and 5% percentiles. Overall, differences in the level of social capital in the
birth neighborhood explain a substantial part of inequalities over generations.
Table 3.5: Wealth distribution, inheritance and individual characteristics
Bottom
1%
Bottom
5%
Bottom
10%
Top
10%
Top
5%
Top
1%
Inheritance (%) 0.2 0.7 1.2 69 81 88
Ability 0.44 0.56 0.60 0.73 0.61 0.58
Education 9.1 12.3 13.4 17.6 15.8 15.2
Social capital 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.55 0.76 0.87
Social capital at birth 0.07 0.13 0.15 0.49 0.59 0.89
Another implication of the model is related to intergenerational mobility. Basically,
individuals at the bottom of the wealth distribution, are those with the lowest social
capital at birth. In equilibrium, 21.3% of individuals live in a better neighborhood than
their parents at retirement age. This suggests a much lower rate of intergenerational
mobility than in the study of Blanden et al. (2002) who estimate this ratio to be around
60% in the UK. Even if they do not report results for France, one could expect an
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intergenerational mobility at least similar to the one in the UK. Given the current trends
in wealth concentration, the results bring new light into the long-term consequences of
such a phenomenon.
3.5 Extensions and Experiments
3.5.1 Extensions
At this point, lifetime inequality is decomposed between individuals, locations and
generational components. The model is simulated with a single source of heterogeneity
at a time. I start with a cohort of individuals born in the same neighborhood and who
receive later the same amount of bequest. Ability is the only source of heterogeneity in
this case.13 Then, I simulate a cohort of homogeneous individuals in terms of ability
and born in the same location. The only source of heterogeneity is the amount of
bequest. Finally, the differences in the level of social capital are analyzed. Using these
three simulations, the lifetime inequality can be decomposed over the contributions of
individuals differences, initial endowment and locations heterogeneity. This simulation
exercise used a sample of 100,000 with all the source of inequality distributed as in the
steady state of the model.
In the long-run, bequest and spatial inequalities account for approximately 80% of
lifetime inequalities. Heterogeneity in individual ability accounts for around 18.2%,
while bequest represents 55% of wealth inequalities. Unfortunately, there is to my
knowledge no paper in the literature with the same sources of inequalities that could be
used as a benchmark for comparison.
These results shed new light on the dynamics of inequalities. In the recent period,
several reports demonstrate that wealth disparities across individuals have widened.
For example, the 2010 French Wealth Survey reports that the discrepancy in wealth
between the top 10% and the bottom 10% of households has increased by 35% from
13The individual component of inequality could have been measured using the level of education.
However, since education depends on the level of social capital of the birth neighborhood, it is more
suitable to use the idiosyncratic ability.
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2004 to 2010 with housing prices as the main driving force. In a context of widening
inequalities between generations and locations, we show clearly that in the long run the
major determinants of inequalities are bequest and differences across locations.
Table 3.6: The decomposition of wealth inequalities
Ability Bequest Social Capital Education
After 10 years 52.3 8.5 40.2 62.4
After 20 years 38.1 25.2 36.7 48.9
After 30 years 29.9 36.5 33.6 42.3
After 40 years 25.1 44.3 29.6 36.8
After 50 years 18.2 55.0 26.8 31.5
3.5.2 Experiments
After having highlighted the importance of bequest and spatial inequalities in the differ-
ences across individuals, the effects of some policies on overall inequalities is simulated.
These policies are based on institutional measures and taxes. In the first experiment, the
borrowing constraints are relaxed. In the second, bequest taxation is imposed. Finally,
the last experiment implements a policy against income segregation that will constraint
every neighborhood to have a diverse population in terms of education.14
3.5.2.1 No borrowing constraints
There are several potential channels under which borrowing constraints could affect the
behavior of agents. The most obvious one is related to the homeownership decision.
Several other channels exist. First, the borrowing constraint of the parents can affect the
level of education of the children. Second, it can delay the homeownership decision of
the young individuals and prevent them from living in the best neighborhoods. The
results shows that all these channels are effective. First, there is a substantial effect
on homeownership. The mean homeownership rate without borrowing constraint is
around 62% to be compared to 54% in the presence of borrowing constraint. This effect
14I use interchangeably the terms melting pot, urban mix, diversity to refer to the policy against
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Table 3.7: The effects of borrowing constraints
Age distribution
Outcomes 21-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-64 65 +
With Borrowing Constraints
Homeownership 6.8 31.1 48.8 58.9 64.2 67.6 71.7
Education 13.9
Social capital 0.21 0.33 0.39 0.42 0.46 0.53 0.47
Without Borrowing Constraints
Homeownership 15.8 34.6 52.1 60.9 67.5 70.2 74.8
Education 14.2
Social capital 0.23 0.32 0.41 0.44 0.47 0.52 0.45
holds for the younger generations. It increases also both the mean and the dispersion of
housing wealth in the population. In fact, an indirect consequence of relaxing borrowing
constraints is on the level of prices. As shown in Figure 3.10, the equilibrium distribution
of prices is much more spread on the right with the mean price moving from 2015 e per
square meter in the model with borrowing constraints to more than 3400 e per square
meter when borrowing constraints are relaxed. This sharp increase is mainly due to
the highly inelastic demand for the best neighborhoods. As a consequence, the number
of neighborhoods with a mean price higher than 5,000 e per square meter increases
substantially from 126 to 280.
Additional implications are in terms of social capital and education. There is a small
distributional effect on the level of social capital of the youngest agents, allowing them
to buy in better neighborhoods than what they could do otherwise. Finally, borrowing
constraints have an effect on the distribution of education. The mechanism is related
to the increase in the level of housing prices which yields higher tax revenues for
the government. The consequence is an appreciation in the level of human capital
acquisition infrastructure. The mean education rate increases from 13.9 to 14.2. However,
this effect holds only for the inhabitants of the neighborhoods with the highest level
of social capital. To sum up, relaxing borrowing constraints is effective in helping
young individuals achieving homeownership. However, because of several undesirable
consequences (prices, education), the net effect on well-being is not clear.
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Figure 3.10: Nonparametric density of the price distribution
3.5.2.2 Bequest taxation
The introduction of a tax on bequest has an important impact of the wealth transmission
behavior of agents. It should be noted that the effect is highly dependent of the taxation
rate. A taxation of 100% is similar to the model with no bequest. The results are similar
but of smaller magnitude for the range of taxation rates higher than 60%. These levels
of taxation act as a disincentive to wealth accumulation and transmission, but provide
more resources to the local governments. Since, the majority of bequests happens in the
best neighborhoods, the ultimate consequence is to increase disparities across locations
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via the education institutions which are financed by local tax revenues.15 A potential
solution would be to assign the bequest to the federal government. This solution creates
a better redistribution and increases the mean educational level. Still, there are lot of
inefficiencies due to overconsumption after retirement.
The most interesting cases occur for a taxation rate between 10 to 30%. There is still
overconsumption, but of a smaller magnitude, and the induced mobility stabilized both
the level of price and the homeownership rate. Table 3.8 reports the distributions of the
share of inheritance, ability and education of individuals located in the tail of the wealth
distribution. The effect of age is accounted for by using a cohort of individuals.
A comparison between these numbers with those Table 3.5 demonstrates that the
mean educational level and the mean ability level of the most wealthy individuals tend
to increase, highlighting the shift toward a society more fair and the decreasing role
inheritance in inequalities.
The mean level of education is highly dispersed across taxation rates. The minimum
level of education tends to increase with the level of taxation as one would have expected
since education is financed by local tax revenues. However, since the model assumes
stationarity in the level of social capital, and given its importance in education, the
assumption prevents the mean education from increasing over time. The share of
inheritance in total wealth decreases substantially with higher taxation rate, particularly
for the most wealthy individuals. This decrease is compensated by a higher share of
highly educated individuals. However, since the level of social capital of the birth
location is a determinant of the level of education, there is still a persistent component
in the level of inequalities.
15After retirement, the location of an individual has no impact on its well-being. As a consequence,
the high rate of bequest taxation drives to a large share of individuals selling their home in the best
neighborhoods and renting in the cheapest ones. These individuals over-consume both housing services
and consumption and end up with a small amount of wealth.
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Table 3.8: Wealth distribution, inheritance and individual characteristics
Taxation Top and Bottom groups (Percentile)
Rate Bottom
1%
Bottom
5%
Bottom
10%
Top
10%
Top
5%
Top
1%
Inheritance [0:100] 0.1 0.6 0.9 56 69 76
10 % Ability [0:1] 0.43 0.58 0.63 0.76 0.67 0.61
Education [9:20] 11.4 13.2 13.1 18.5 17.7 16.8
Inheritance 0.1 0.5 0.8 45 51 63
15 % Ability 0.44 0.57 0.68 0.76 0.70 0.66
Education 11.4 12.9 13.7 17.6 17.4 17.5
Inheritance 0.1 0.4 0.8 40 46 57
20 % Ability 0.41 0.49 0.58 0.79 0.72 0.70
Education 11.3 12.1 13.4 18.1 17.9 17.6
Inheritance 0.1 0.3 0.8 36 41 55
25 % Ability 0.42 0.52 0.60 0.78 0.71 0.71
Education 11.8 12.6 13.9 18.3 18.0 17.9
Inheritance 0 0.3 0.7 32 38 49
30 % Ability 0.43 0.51 0.57 0.79 0.72 0.73
Education 11.8 13.1 13.8 18.4 17.9 17.9
3.5.2.3 Diversity
The last policy consists of imposing to each location a minimum share of low educated
individuals. I present the results with 15% of low educated individuals in each location.
In Figure 3.11, the initial and equilibrium distributions of prices and social capital are
plotted. The major effect is a reduction in the dispersion of both the level of prices and
social capital. This policy acts as a bound to the average local social capital and holds
back the growth of housing prices. Compared to alternative policies, this policy performs
better because it softens the individual trade-off between neighborhoods. More precisely,
it acts as the maximum level of social capital that prevent prices but also homeownership
to increase as they do in the basic model.
Conclusion
In this paper, I proposed a model to study the outcomes of the housing, labor and edu-
cation markets when local interactions matter. This paper makes several contributions
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Figure 3.11: Prices and social capital with urban mix
to the literature. First, to my knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze homeowner-
ship decision with endogenous prices not derived from a construction sector but from
rational expectations on future prices accounting for neighborhood quality. Second, the
heterogeneity of locations combined with the dynamics of prices provides a powerful
tool for analyzing the dynamics of inequalities. Third, frictions in the labor market
and imperfections in the credit market create an insurance problem. Saving acts as a
self-insurance mechanism against negative shocks. The trade-off between bonds and
housing assets allow individual to diversify their investment thanks to the presence of
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transaction costs in the housing market. Finally, the introduction of a bequest motive
allows to investigate the dynamics of generational inequalities.
The results show that the model performs well in explaining several stylized facts. A
decomposition of the lifetime inequality demonstrates that bequest accounts for a sizable
part of lifetime inequality, while the spatial inequalities account for approximately 25%
of the overall inequalities. I carry several experiments using the model. One of the most
interesting result is related to the relaxing of borrowing constraints. One of the main
consequence of such a policy is to increase the level of prices. This outcome may be the
explanation of the level of housing prices observed in the majority of the developed
countries before the 2008 crisis. Among all the policies considered, a mix of bequest
taxation and diversity policy would provide an efficient control for the level of spatial
and generational inequalities. In practice, it may be argued that a policy of diversity is
hard to implement. One should note that a similar policy exists in France. Instead of
imposing a share of low educated individuals, it imposes to each location a minimum
share of public housing. For a policy maker interested in decreasing lifetime inequalities,
this is a good starting point.
Although the model presents several advantages, the results are subject to several
modeling simplifications. First, the model does not consider education as a choice
variable. A more appropriate human capital accumulation would have been suitable.
Second, the highly parametrized frictions of the labor market should be replaced by a
search model. These two natural extensions are left for future research.
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This thesis contains three essays on the causes of spatial inequalities and the policies that
can be used to tackle them. The common feature of the three essays is that they propose
a structural modelling of spatial inequalities. Thus, the individual choices are derived as
the solution to an optimization problem over a long period of time. In the first essay,
we estimate an optimal stopping model of individual mobility decision along with a
hedonic model of optimal housing choice. In the second essay, I evaluate the French
Enterprise Zones using an estimated search equilibrium model with endogenous spatial
matching between firms and individuals. In the final essay, I investigate the long run
consequences of segregation using an overlapping generation model with interactions
between housing, labor, education and a bequest motive.
Despite the differences across the markets considered, the quantitative methods used
and the type of equilibrium studied, these three essays share the same investigation of the
causes of segregation, policy evaluation when facing discrepancy between locations and
mobility patterns, and propose new policies to help circumvent the growing differences
between locations in the long run.
In the first essay, we develop a framework to estimate the willingness to pay for
the housing and location attributes in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. We
proposes an innovative estimation method of hedonic models showing that unbiased
parameters can be obtained using tenure data, and an exogenous rent variation like rent
control. In contrast to former literature, we use two sources of identification that com-
plement each others. The characteristics of housing units and their inhabitants are used
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as in the hedonic literature along with the conditional probability of whether to move or
stay. The estimation results demonstrate that unobserved housing characteristics matter,
and since they are negatively correlated to the observed housing characteristics, the
failure to account for them downwards the estimated parameters.
In the second essay, I investigate the effectiveness of the French Enterprise Zones
policy. For this purpose, I develop a search model to account for the frictions in the labor
market, and make of it an equilibrium model to account for the general equilibrium
effects. The model generates segmentation between two locations by assuming the
existence of agglomeration externalities, and search frictions that result into a lower job
arrival rate when the firm and individual locations differ. The results show that the
policy has very limited effect on unemployment. Further simulations indicate that the
number of firms in FEZs should be multiplied by 20 in order to close the gap between
them and the rest of the urban space. The decomposition of the job arrival rate highlights
the importance of location specific effects, and the physical distance between workplace
and residential locations. This evidence suggests a change in public policy strategy. That
is, in the short run one may subsidize mobility of unemployed individuals, while in the
long term invest in policies that are able to change the unobserved component of the
deprived locations.
In the final essay, I analyze the determinants of differences across individuals, lo-
cations and generations. to the dynamics of inequalities. I develop an overlapping
generation model where heterogeneous agents along dimensions like ability, education,
and amount of inheritance live into heterogeneous locations. The locations are heteroge-
nous with regard to the level of social capital which affects individual productivity in the
labor market. The model shows that the current level of homeownership is higher than
its value in equilibrium. Moreover, I report in equilibrium a much higher variance of
prices compared to the initial ones observed in the data. The decomposition of lifetime
inequalities shows that a sizeable share of long run inequalities comes from differences
in bequest and spatial inequalities. Among the set of experiments considered, I show
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that a mix of bequest taxation and social mixity in each location would provide an
efficient control for the spatial and generational inequalities.
Of course, these three essays are subject to limits that may constitute baseline for
future research. In the first essay, our model does not permit to identify separately the
housing unobserved characteristics from the neighborhood ones. Another source of
identification would be required for that. Moreover, it would be of particular interest
to extend the framework to allow for individual unobserved characteristics. The condi-
tional choice probability based on length of stay may help for identification in the same
way as in the literature on unobserved heterogeneity in duration models. Finally, a more
suitable dataset would allowed us to introduce a real theory of location choice.
In the second essay, several difficulties related to the data quality forced me to
over simplify the model. The evaluation of local tax holiday policies is particularly
complicated by the need to model at the same time firms’ location choice, individual
search in the labor market, individual location choice, and the equilibrium effect of
the policy on wage distributions. Though, the inclusion of equilibrium effects has its
drawbacks. That is, the individual mobility part is not clearly connected to the labor
market outcomes, complicated out of sample inferences based. With regard to this
particular issue, one would prefer a partial equilibrium that would be less natural for the
analysis of firms behavior. One needs to clearly think through all the possible avenues
and makes the choice that yields the most suitable models. I believe that equilibrium
effects remain an important aspect of the policy.
In the third essay, a natural extension would be to increase the sources of individuals’
heterogeneity. In most respects, this will allow for a more realistic definition of social
capital. Ideally, one would like to estimate this model. Estimation of macroeconomic
models represents a great challenge, but worthwhile especially in topics that are policy-
related as this one. The set of individual choices could be easily modeled within a
likelihood approach. Furthermore, the model generates several moments. An approach
building on Imai, Jain, and Ching (2009) and Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) should be
feasible.
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A.1 Data selection
A.1.1 Labor market data
We restrict our attention to the continuous surveys, we select only individuals whose
first interview data are available and may theoretically be interviewed at least four times.
That is all the individuals interviewed for the first time between march 2003 and march
2008. The final sample selection is as follows:
• We apply the same selection criteria as Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (1999).
That is, we dispose of individuals who at some stage were students, in military
force, retired, housewives, working in government jobs, and older than the legal
retirement age
• We get rid of all individuals with a missing location identifier, and individuals
located in a metropolitan area with no ZFUs.
• We dropped all the individuals for whom the firm identifier is missing making it
impossible to recover the job location
• We drop all the cities with less than 40 individuals located in a FEZ
Another issue is related to the panel dimension of the labor survey. As pointed out
before, the survey follows over six periods housing units and not individuals. Indeed,
the method of survey is not the same depending on the period of interview. Data are
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collected on the field for the first and the last interviews while they are collected by phone
from the second to the fifth interviews. This yields a high degree of unbalancedness in
the sample, and may create a confusion between attrition and mobility.
The final sample is composed of 13,231 individuals located into 10 cities.
A.1.2 Mobility information
We start with the initial sample of the French Permanent Demographic Sample. This
sample is obtained by picking the census files of individuals born between the 1st and
4th of October. This records a total sample of 2,152,175 individuals born between 1862
and 2009, with 1,617,380 individuals present in the annual surveys.
We dispose of all dead individuals not surveyed after 2004 (193,906). We get rid of
individuals younger than 20 years because they are not old enough to have two observa-
tions in the time (554,932), individuals older than 100 years (16,471), and individuals not
living in metropolitan France (744).
With this data at hand of 1,386,122 individuals, we focus on the period from 1990
to 2009. However, we have to cope with a substantial amount of attrition between the
sample of 1990, 1999 and 2009. That is, we observe only around 350,000 individuals in
both 1990, 1999 and in 2009 censuses. We ignore this issue and construct two samples.
The first corresponds to individuals present at the same time in the 1990 and 1999 popu-
lation censuses and is composed of around 500,000 individuals. The second represents
individuals in both the 1999 and in one of the population censuses, which represents
approximatively 350,000.
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Table 3.9: Transitions between the rest of the space and the ZUS from 1990 to 2009
Type of transitions from 1990 to 1999
Individual Not Non ZUS Non ZUS ZUS ZUS
Characteristics Mobile → Non ZUS → ZUS → Non ZUS →ZUS
Age 20 - 24 7.5 9.8 16.1 10.0 14.1
25 - 29 3.9 13.3 20.3 15.1 13.1
30 - 39 8.6 26.8 30.1 37.1 22.8
40 - 49 21.6 20.1 17.0 20.0 19.4
50 - 59 21.8 13.2 9.3 9.4 14.8
60 - 99 36.6 16.8 7.2 8.5 15.8
Male 45.9 47.3 45.5 46.4 44.5
Married/cohab 34.3 50.5 48.8 58.2 43.5
Citizenship Native 96.3 96.6 92.8 92.3 86.4
Immigrant 3.7 3.4 7.2 7.7 13.6
Education No diploma 44.4 28.7 33.4 31.1 50.0
Vocational 31.3 33.1 33.5 37.3 32.6
High school 11.7 15.6 15.2 13.5 10.0
Associates 6.3 11.3 9.2 9.9 4.3
University 6.4 11.3 8.8 8.2 3.1
Job Status Unemployed 10.5 11.3 22.9 15.3 26.7
Tenure Homeownership 77.4 53.0 16.9 40.8 19.8
Renting 18.4 38.9 74.8 51.5 73.5
Type of transitions from 1999 to 2009
Individual Not Non ZUS Non ZUS ZUS ZUS
Characteristics Mobile → Non ZUS → ZUS → Non ZUS →ZUS
Age 20 - 24 6.9 8.2 13.1 9.1 12.4
25 - 29 4.0 10.8 16.5 10.7 14.7
30 - 39 6.0 27.9 28.2 31.6 24.7
40 - 49 15.8 22.3 18.1 23.3 19.0
50 - 59 21.5 12.4 11.6 11.6 14.0
60 - 99 45.8 18.4 12.5 13.7 15.1
Male 47.7 47.9 46.0 47.5 45.6
Married/cohab 34.3 34.9 51.1 34.9 49.2
Citizenship Native 92.9 93.4 82.0 83.9 68.9
Immigrant 7.1 6.6 18.0 16.1 31.1
Education No diploma 36.3 20.2 24.4 26.1 41.6
Vocational 34.4 31.8 30.1 36.2 33.5
High school 14.1 19.3 19.8 16.6 12.6
Associates 8.2 15.0 13.1 12.0 6.7
University 7.1 13.8 12.6 9.1 5.6
Job Status Unemployed 8.7 9.5 18.1 14.0 25.4
Tenure Homeownership 80.6 51.3 22.7 41.4 15.0
Renting 17.2 40.2 68.2 51.0 78.6
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Table 3.10: Transitions between ZFU and the rest of the space ZFU
Type of transitions from 1990 to 1999
Individual Non ZFU Non ZFU ZFU ZFU
Characteristics → Non ZFU → ZFU → Non ZFU →ZFU
Age 20 - 24 10.1 15.1 10.9 14.7
25 - 29 13.5 15.6 17.3 17.4
30 - 39 27.3 25.9 35.6 32.7
40 - 49 20.0 18.9 18.8 16.1
50 - 59 13.0 12.6 9.2 10.3
60 - 99 16.1 11.8 8.2 8.8
Male 47.2 44.4 45.8 42.8
Married/cohab 50.7 46.4 57.0 53.6
Citizenship Native 96.2 88.3 93.0 79.9
Immigrant 3.8 11.7 7.0 20.1
Education No diploma 29.3 42.1 31.7 51.5
Vocational 33.3 33.9 37.7 33.8
High school 15.3 12.4 13.6 7.3
Associates 11.1 7.1 9.7 4.3
University 11.0 4.5 7.3 3.1
Job Status Unemployed 12.0 25.1 16.9 31.7
Tenure Homeownership 51.0 19.6 39.4 13.8
Renting 41.0 73.0 52.4 77.7
Type of transitions from 1999 to 2009
Individual Non ZFU Non ZFU ZFU ZFU
Characteristics → Non ZFU → ZFU → Non ZFU →ZFU
Age 20 - 24 8.4 13.5 9.1 13.8
25 - 29 10.9 17.9 10.6 14.3
30 - 39 28.0 29.1 30.8 24.3
40 - 49 22.3 15.2 23.4 16.9
50 - 59 12.4 12.7 11.2 12.8
60 - 99 18.0 11.6 14.9 12.9
Male 47.9 43.4 47.1 46.7
Married/cohab 35.2 49.1 37.2 48.8
Citizenship Native 92.8 80.3 81.6 66.8
Immigrant 7.2 19.7 18.4 33.2
Education No diploma 20.5 27.6 27.2 42.2
Vocational 31.9 31.2 36.7 35.4
High school 19.2 18.1 16.6 13.0
Associates 14.8 13.3 11.8 5.5
University 13.6 9.9 7.6 3.9
Job Status Unemployed 9.8 21.4 14.6 26.3
Tenure Homeownership 50.2 23.0 41.3 14.9
Renting 41.3 67.4 50.8 79.6
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A.2 The likelihood functions
In order to understand the estimation algorithm, it is important to understand the
formation of the likelihood. We consider individual transitions in the labor market,
but the number of transitions that we can consider is highly constrained by the data.
Let’s start with some basic definitions. Assume, we observe an individual for the first
interview. Its labor market position can be summarized:
d =

1, if unemployed
0, if employed
Its residential location can also be summarized as:
dA =

1, if the individual lives in A
0, if the individual lives in B
Let’s denote by w0e , the observed wage of employees at the first interview. wu
and we are respectively the wages accepted by an individual formerly unemployed
and employed. The wage is recorded only at the first and the last interview. If we
were to consider several transition to employment the accepted wage will be missing.
Hence, in the best cases, we can consider up to two transitions per individuals. That is,
for individuals initially unemployed, we can observe the initial unemployment spell
denoted tup or dup = 1 indicating that the duration is censored. If there is no transition,
we denote by tur the residual unemployment duration. Then, it follows that we can only
consider the first transition to employment due = 1 and the corresponding employment
duration tuer with no missing data issue. However, it may happen that this employment
spell did not last until the 6th interview, in that case the wage is missing, and we denote
der = 1
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Let’s consider now an individual initially employed. We observe the initial employ-
ment spell tep or dup = 1 indicating that the duration is censored. In this situation, the
two possible cases are summarized by:
υt =

1, if job-to-unemployment transition in period t
0, if job-to-job transition
Then, if individuals makes a job to job transition, we denote by tee the duration of its
last transition which can be censored dee = 1. If the employment duration is not censored
the wage accepted at the job-to job transition will be missing, and we do not consider
the subsequent transition. If the individuals makes a transition to unemployment, we
denote by teu the corresponding unemployment duration, and deur = 1 indicates that
this duration is not censored.
We need also to define an additional dummy for the location where the job has been
found:
dta =

1, if individual makes a transition to a job in A in period t
0, If individual makes a transition to a job in Z in period t
Finally, we need to define a dummies indicating a transition in the housing market:
dm =

1, if individual does not move
0, if individual does move
We are now in position of defining the likelihood. We derive the contribution to the
likelihood of an observation, the sample analog is obtained by taking the product.
For notation convenience, we will omit the individual index in this subsection. Let’s
start with an unemployed individual drawn in the location A. The model provides the
probability to draw such an individual and it is given by u
A
mA
. Its contribution can be
written
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LAu =
uA
mA
[λAAu λ
ZA
u ]
1−dup exp
(
− [λAAu λZAu ][tup + tur])[[[
λAAu [ f
A(wu)− θAA
]]d1a[
λZAu [ f
Z(wu)− θAZ]
]1−d1a]]dm×d1ur
[
exp
{− [δ+ [λAAe λZAe ]F¯(we)]teur}[{δυ1[[λAAe ]d2a [λZAe ]1−d2a]1−υ1}]der
]dm
We can move to the contribution of an individual who was employed at the time of
the first interview. The corresponding probability to be sampled is given by m
A−uA
mA
. This
likelihood is similar to be one of individuals initially unemployed,
LAe =
mA − uA
mA
.gA(we).
[
δ+ [λAAe λ
ZA
e ]F¯(we)
]1−dep
[
exp
{− [δ+ [λAAe λZAe ]F¯(we)]ter}[{δυ1[[λAAe ]d1a [λZAe ]1−d1a]1−υ1}]1−der
]dm
[[
exp
(
− [λAAu λZAu ][teur])[[λAAu [ f A(wu)− θAA]]d2a [λZAu − [ f B(wu)− θAZ]]1−d2a]1−deur]v1
]dm
We do not consider a potential third job-to-job transition. The corresponding like-
lihoods for an individual initially living in Z are symmetric, and are written LZu and
LZe .
Thus, the total contribution of the labor market to the likelihood Ll can be derived
Ll =
[LAu ]dA×d[LAe ]dA×[1−d][LAe ][1−dA]×[1−d][LAu ][1−dA]×d (3.15)
Finally, we can write the likelihood associated to firm mobility.
L f (w, µ) =
N
∏
j=1
T
∏
t
K
∏
k
[
Pr(k,w, µj)
]dtk[
1− Pr(k,w, µj)
]1−dtk
(3.16)
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Where dtk is a dummy indicating whether or not firm j makes the choices k in period
t.
At last, let us consider the cases where a wage is missing. Depending on the type
of transition, we sample a new wage using a simple Metropolis Sampler. For each
observation missing, we can find a nearest estimator:
• For an individual initially employed, ws = we + ǫ
• For an individual initially unemployed,ws = wu+ ǫwherewu is thewage accepted
by workers of the same type as the individual.
The wage is drawn as follows: draw the candidate wage w∗ from the proposal
density πw(w∗|w(s)). Then, derive the acceptance probability
Pa = min
{
w∗πw(w(s)|w∗)
w(s)πw(w∗|w(s))
, 1
}
(3.17)
That is, let w(s+1) = w∗ (i.e., accept) with probability Pa and let w(s+1) = w(s) (i.e.,
reject) with probability 1− Pa. Then, we sample 100 new wages. The individual wage is
obtained by taking the mean.
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A.2.1 List of notations
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Table 3.11: List of notations
Variables Definition Value/ grid
Indexes
i individual index
n neighborhood index
Aggregate variables
Y Production 20 points
G Government expenditures -
K Capital 20 points
l unit of labor productivity with ∑ l = L 40 points
State and choice variables
a Age 20 - 85
b bonds (wealth) 700 points
c Consumption (goods) 15 points
d Unemployment benefit 0.8 ∗ w
e Labor market status -
h Consumption (housing) 15 points
j individual ability 0-1
ι tenure -
p housing price -
q rent -
r interest rate 0.04
T˜ Age of retirement 65
y Individual income -
w human capital 9-20
z neighborhood level of social capital 0-1
Parameters
α capital share 0.32
β discount rate 0.95
θ deterministic probability to survive see text
Γ family size see text
ψ inherited or transmitted wealth 0.25
ς Parent’s degree of altruism towards her child 0.17
σ share of housing 0.30
γ inverse of inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 2
̟ wage rate
χ product per unit of labor productivity
ty tax rate on income 0.20
t tax rate on capital interest 0.07
tr tax rate on renters 0.016
tpr tax rate for real estate agencies 0.003
tp tax rate for homeowners 0.005
δh depreciation rate for housing 0.015
δk depreciation rate for capital 0.01
τh transaction cost 0.15
λ Job arrival rate see text
ϑ Job destruction rate 0.04
κ downpayment rate 0.3
Π distribution over population, Πa,ΠZ,ΠW ,ΠJ ,Πbn
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A.2.2 Computation details
A.2.2.1 Updating procedure of housing prices
Initial prices : Let’s assume that the prices are constant:
pn1 = p
n
2 = p
n
3 = . . . = . . . = p
n
t == p
n
t+1 == p
n
T−1 == p
n
T or put differently
pnT−1
pnT
= 1
Under constant price assumption, using former simulations, I can derive housing
demand HDt = H
HD
t + H
RD
t t for each period in each neighborhood. However, the
prices determination require only housing demand for homeowners. Housing supply is
exogenous in our model and given by HSt = H
HS
t + H
RS
t . The equilibrium price at t=1,
p
n(1)
1 , is determined by market clearing condition H
HS
t = H
RS
t
Update and convergence I assume that for the sequences k-1 and k of equilibrium
prices, the ratio between period is constant:
p
n(k)
t+1
p
n(k)
t
=
p
n(k−1)
t+1
p
n(k−1)
t
∀k
The equilibrium prices are derived assuming that the ratio between current and
next prices are the same as in the first sequence {pn(1)t }Tt=1. Since the prices of the first
sequence are recovered from the constant price assumption, I can expect their ratio to
speed-up the convergence. At time t = 1, I derive housing demand under the constant
price ratio assumption, and derive {pn(2)t }Tt=1 . Using the same strategy, I can recover the
entire sequence {pn(2)t }Tt=1.
Finally, I keep updating using the former price ratio until |{pn(k)t }Tt=1 − {pn(1)t }Tt=1|
where ǫ is a defined criterion. The corresponding prices are the rational expectation
equilibrium prices and given by {pnt }Tt=1
A.2.2.2 Discretization and Parametrization
Family size and consumption In order to adjust the housing and consumption profile
for a typical household I use a household equivalence scale. The aim is to keep the
welfare of the family constant as the family size varies over the life-cycle.
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Table 3.12: Family size and consumption
Family Housing Goods
size consumption consumption
1 100 100
2 120 130
3 150 160
4 180 205
5 210 250
Equivalence scale between housing and non housing consumption
obtained using the Survey of life conditions.
Education: I assume that the education level acquired by an individual is a function of
its birth neighborhood and its ability. The levels of education goes from 9 to 20. I bound
the minimum level of education to reflect the fact that education is compulsory until
age 16. Half of education is due to ability, and half to the birth neighborhood. It may be
argued that locations do not reflect half of educational differences across individuals.
The location served two purposes: it reflects the human capital acquisition cost, and
Life and death: The probability to survive are derived from the INED tables of life
expectancy.16. I scaled the expectancy tables such that at age 80 the survival rate is equal
to 0. The corresponding survival probability is given by Figure 3.12.
The level of social capital: I define the level of social capital z to be a function of three
variables evaluated at the neighborhood level: mean education level, unemployment
rate and the homeownership rate. The precise specification is the following.
zn = a1.edun + a2.unempn + a3.homen (3.18)
In this specification, I put a higher weight on education. I specify a1, a2 and a3
such that respectively 55%, 30% and 15 % of the level of social capital are explained
by education, unemployment and homeownership rate. The nonparametric density is
given by Figure 3.13.
16InstitutNational des Etudes demographiques is the French office for demographic studies
134
Appendix: Essay3
Figure 3.12: Survival over the life cycle
Figure 3.13: Nonparametric density of social capital
The productivity process: The productivity function is given by:
135
Appendix: Essay3
la jzw = ∑
a
b1 ∗ la + b2 ∗ lj + b3 ∗ lz + b4 ∗ lw (3.19)
In order to get the parameters b, I estimate this equation on the labor surveys and
replacing individual unobserved by a fixed effect. After extensive analysis, I choose
the parameters b such that 40% of the wage is explained by education. The three others
variables (age, location, ability) account each for 20% of the productivity.
I assume the following structure between age and productivity.
la =
√
a if 20 < a < 30
la = la−1 + log(a+ 1)− log(a) if 31 < a < 45
la = la−1 +
√
(a+ 1)−
√
(a) if 46 < a < 66
Figure 3.14: Wage over the life cycle
Labor market: I assume that labor market is equilibrium. That is, the flow of workers
finding a job is similar to the flow of workers laid-off. I need to assume how individuals
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leave unemployment. To do so, I estimate using the 2002 Labor Survey, a duration
model of unemployment. I estimate a hazard function out of unemployment. This yields
a negative time-dependency. Moreover, for each neighborhood a hazard rate out of
unemployment is estimated.
Once the initial job arrival is set-up, its evolution follows a first-order markov process.
The level of autocorrelation over time is assumed to be proportional to changes in the
level of social capital.
Initial school differences: The distribution of i f is simulated to fit the differences
between locations in high school graduation rates.
Matching the model and the data at the initial period: To produce a good fit, several
calibrations are imposed by the model. First, the wage rate is used to match the wage
profile over the life-cycle. In addition, the interest rate along with assumptions on the
productivity process help fitting the unemployment rate over the life-cycle. Spatial dif-
ferences in unemployment is captured by a calibrated neighborhood-specific job arrival.
Spatial differences in the wage profile are captured through the initial distribution of
education and social capital across locations.
It is not trivial to match the moments of the housing market. However, the deprecia-
tion rate of housing, the initial distribution of prices, the residential and property taxes
are very useful tools in matching both the mean homeownership rate and its distribution
over locations. Our calibrated parameters are obtained after a fine tuning allowing to
match the data and the model at the initial period.
Finally, it is not trivial to match the wealth distribution. Nonetheless, it turns out that
the work achieved on the housing market helps fitting the shape and the left-tail of the
wealth distribution. In the dynamic setup, the evolution of prices succeeds in matching
the top percentiles. The local differences in the outcome of the housing market generates
a local wealth distribution that fits extremely well the data.
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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on the structural analysis of spatial inequalities. The first two
essays rely on estimated parameters while the third is a fully calibrated model. In the first essay, we
investigate the magnitude of individual willingness to pay for housing and neighborhood attributes by
estimating a dynamic hedonic model. We use the mobility choice from the housing tenure data and
the observed hedonic housing characteristics as the main sources of identification. Our results show
that the observed and unobserved housing characteristics are negatively correlated. Failure to take into
account the endogeneity bias could underestimate the true value of the observed characteristics of housing.
In the second essay, I propose an equilibrium search model to assess the effectiveness of the French
Employment Zones Policies. Each metropolitan area is considered as a local labor market that consists
of a central location and an inner suburb. Firms and individuals may decide to move as an outcome of
the policy. The results demonstrates that the policy has very limited effect on unemployment. Further
investigations indicate that for the policy to work, the number of firms in ZFUs should be multiplied by
20, which constitutes an objective out of reach. Finally, in the third essay, I analyze the contribution of
differences across individuals and locations to the dynamics of segregation and inequalities. I develop a
Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari type model where several frictions are represented. More precisely, we allow
for segmentation between homeowners and renters in the housing market, imperfection in the capital
market and individual mobility over the life-cycle. The dynamics of price combined to bequest motive
provide the perfect framework to understand the tenure choice of individuals.
Keywords: Structural dynamic model; equilibrium search; Overlapping Generation model; Hedonic;
Policy evaluation; intergenerational inequalities
Résumé
Cette thèse présente trois articles où des agents optimisateurs tiennent compte dans leurs choix présents
de leurs situations futures. Dans le premier essai, nous estimons un modèle dynamique de choix de
logement. Nous nous intéressons à la disponibilité à payer pour les caractéristiques du logement en
estimant un modèle hédonique dynamique. Notre méthode d’estimation tient compte des caractéristiques
inobservables du logement, qui peuvent être de surcroît corrélées aux caractéristiques observées. Nous
utilisons la régulation des loyers comme principale source d’identification, qui rend les loyers indépendants
des conditions locales du marché du logement. Les résultats indiquent une corrélation négative entre
l’hétérogénéité non observée et les paramètres. L’impossibilité de tenir compte de cette hétérogénéité
biaiserait les paramètres. Dans le deuxième essai, nous proposons un modèle d’appariement sur le marché
du travail pour évaluer la politique publique des zones franches urbaines. Nous modélisons chaque aire
urbaine comme un marché local du travail composé d’une localisation centrale et d’une banlieue. Les
firmes font des choix de localisation en fonction de leur productivité. La segmentation ainsi générée crée
une différence entre les taux d’arrivée des offres des deux localisations. Les résultats démontrent que la
politique a un effet très faible sur le chômage. De plus, le modèle suggère qu’il faudrait multiplier par
20 le nombre de firmes en ZFUs afin d’avoir un effet sur le chômage. Enfin, dans le troisième essai, nous
analysons la contribution respective des différences individuelles et entre localisations à la dynamique de
la ségrégation et des inégalités. Nous développons un modèle dans l’esprit de Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari
où plusieurs frictions sont présentes. Plus précisément, nous introduisons une segmentation entre les
propriétaires et les locataires, l’imperfection du marché du crédit et la mobilité au cours du cycle de vie. De
plus, la localisation des individus affecte leur productivité, leur accumulation de capital via la dynamique
des prix des logements, et le processus d’acquisition de capital humain de la génération. Nous analysons
ainsi la mobilité individuelle à partir de ce cadre de travail.
Mots Clés : Modèles dynamiques structurels ; Modèles de recherche d’emploi d’équilibre ; Modèles à gé-
nérations imbriquées ; modèle hédonique, Evaluation de politiques publiques, inégalités entre générations
